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Introduction and summary.

Letter text, 4 July 1776

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Virginia:

In the High Court of Chancery March 16, 1798

Between Robert Pleasants, son and heir of Jon Plesaeants, deed. Pltf.

Mary Logan, widow and administratix of Charles Logan, and divisee of John Pleasants and Jonathan Pleasants, deceased,Elizabeth Pleasants, administratix of Joseph Pleasants, deceased,Isaac Pleasants and Jane his wife, Samuel Pleasants, junior, Thomas Pleasants, junior, and Margaret his wife, Robert Langley and Elizabeth his wife, Daniel Teasdale and Margaret his wife, late Margaret Langley, Elizabeth Langley the younger, and Anne May,

On the ***(motion?) of the Plaintiff by his counsel, the court doth order that the Defendants, who are in possession of any slaves that are the subject of concovery*** between the parties in this suit, do not carry or remove them, or cause them, or any of them, to be carried or removed out of the commonwealth during the pendency of this suit, or until the further order of the court.

June 7, 1798 On the motion of Daniel Teasdale by his counsel, leave is given him to amend his answer, whereupon he filed the same. September the 12th, 1798

Between Robert Pleasants, son and heir of John Pleasants, Pltf. And Cary Pleasants and Mary Pleasants his wife, late Mary Logan, administratrix of Charles Logan, and divisee of John Pleasants and Jonathan Pleasants, Dec'd and others. Deft. And between Ned, a pauper, *** And Elizabeth Pleasants, Deft. In these causes, which came on last term to be heard the bills(?), demurrers and asnwers, and on the testaments of John Pleasants

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and Jonathan Pleasants, and the Joural of the House of Delegates, exhibited and read, and were argued by counsel, the court on this twelfth day of September, in the year of our lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety eight, overruled the demurrers, because the right to freedom proposed to be asserted by the plaintiff on behalf of certain men, women and children detained in slavery, which freedom the former owner of some of them and of the progenitors of others could not bestow, altough solicitous to bestow it, during his life time, was, preserved, if it could be preserved, until enjoyment of the bless would be permitted by temporary and conditional bequests of the slaves, with a confidence that in an event which might remove the legal obstacle to deliverance from the hr***ldom. the legataries would fulfil the testator's desire, so that the intermediate possession of the legataries, if that desire were not inane(???) was ficuiary, & in suhc a case, the elements, from which juridical(???) arrangements commence, prove the question which hath occured to be peculiarly proper for praetorian animadversion for decision before a tribunal erected especially to foster and effectuate conscientious fideicommissa: and upon that question which is the capital subject of disceptatin and some others in consequence thereof the court declared its opinion in these terms, the condition which the testator, John Pleasants, enjoined the legataries, and which, if it were lawful, excepting the bequest they were obliged implicitly to perform, was not contrary to law. Such a provision for emancipation was not prohivted literally by the statute in 1748, the only instituted law then extant, which can be quoted for that purpose, enacting "that no slave shall be set free, "upon an pretence, except for services to be adjudged by the governor "and council to be meritorious," the statute operated only upon emancipations efficatious immediately, not those of which the efficacy was fortuitous; and ampliation of the statute giving it energy in cases of which similar predicaments might seem to require similar policy, is reprobated in this instance, where the defendants, in a court of equity, are invoking its aid to hinder the restitution of a right, of which they, on whose behalf it is claimed, and their progenitors, could not have been deprived without violation of equitable constitutional principles. An objection urged by one of the counsel for the defendants, if it were not misunderstood, namely, that John Pleasants, who dying before the statute permitted manumission of slaves, enacted in the year 1782, was never authorised to manumit his slaves, could not enjoy manumission of them in any circumstances, is founded upon a position conceived not to be true, unless the act required by the condition to be performed were a malum in se; that a condition requiring performance of an act, not whilst the performance would be unlawful,

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but when it would, if ever it should be lawful, that such a condition to be performed, not after an intolerable lenght of time, is unlawful seems an absurd positionl upon the doctrine of perpetuities, if applicable to any cases, in which human liberty is challenged, can not be found an objection against the slaves existing at the death of the testator, John Pleasants, or against the slaves born after, of mothers exisiting before his death; for their cases are examples of the legitimate periods, during which emergence or lapse of contingent dispositions may be suspended, namely, where events before the termination of a life or lives existent, or of a life or lives immediately succeeding hte existent, must fix the destiny. Here the slaves for whose benefit the testator intended the bequests are first, those of whom he was POSSESSED at the time of his death, and secondly, those of whose MOTHERS he was so possessed. The period of time during ability of the slaves to enjoy when the legislature should permit them to enjoy this benefit was suspended, did not exced the tolerated period. I was during the lives of them, who survived the testator, and of them who were born after his death, of mothers surviving him, sothat, in equity, of the slaves, on whose behalf this prosecution was instituted, they who were thirty years old or older, in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty two, when the statute authorising manumission was enacted, were, at that time entitlted, they, who born before his death are not yet thirty years old, will be when they shall attain that age, intitled to freedom, they who were born between the times of the said testator's death and of enacting the said statute will be when they shall attain the same age intitled to freedom, and they who have been born since the said statute was enacted, were at their birth entitled to freedom; and the plaintiff not only the heir but the surviving executor of the said John Pleasants, is the proper party to dindicate the that freedom, and require fulfilment of his desire repeatedly declared in his testament, and the court doth direct one of the commissioners thereof to report a catalogue of the slaves aforesaid, distinguishing the times when, according to the foregoing opinion, any of them ought therefore to have been and hereafter to be liberated from servitude, and stating accounts of profits, to which they who have been wronfulyl detained are intitled. September 26th, 1798 The Defendants Cary Pleasants and MAry his wife, late Mary Logan, administratix of Charles Logan, and devisee of John Pleasantt's and Jonathan Pleasants, deceased, Elizabeht Pleasants, administratix of Joseph Pleasants, deceased, Isaac Pleasants and Jane his wife, Samuel Pleasants, jan.(???) and Thomas Pleasants, junior, and Margaret his wife, in the ??? suit, and the defendant

See also

• S. Bassett French Biographical Sketch
• Other Related Wythepedia Pages

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