Difference between revisions of "Blunt v. Gee"
(Created page with "{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Blunt v. Gee''}} File:CallsReports1833V5BluntvGee.pdf|link=Media:CallsReports1833V5BluntvGee.pdf|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsRe...") |
|||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
===The Court's Decision=== | ===The Court's Decision=== | ||
| − | Chancellor Wythe gave the plaintiff, Mary Gee both her life estate and distributive share in real and personal property, despite the late renunciation of her first husband’s will. The | + | Chancellor Wythe gave the plaintiff, Mary Gee, both her life estate and distributive share in real and personal property, despite the late renunciation of her first husband’s will. In his opinion Wythe reasoned "that the appellee, Mary Gee, by failure to renounce the benefit (if it were a benefit) bestowed upon her, by her former husband in his testament, was not barred of her dower in his lands, nor her share of his goods." The Court of Appeals reversed. |
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 17:57, 30 November 2017
File:CallsReports1833V5BluntvGee.pdf
Blunt v. Gee, Call Vol. V 481 (1805), [1] discussed a widow’s distributive share in her late husband’s personal estate, when she failed to renounce his will within a year.
Background
Mary Gee and her step children sued the estates of Mrs. Gee’s deceased husband and daughter for their share of estate. However, Mrs. Gee renounced the will of her deceased husband after a year. The estate of her husband uses this claim to prevent Mrs. Gee from obtaining her life estate and share in the property but rather enforcing the will her former husband left. In addition, the administrators argue that because Mrs. Gee’s daughter was underage, that her share of the estate should be divided in line with the law rather than a will.
The Court's Decision
Chancellor Wythe gave the plaintiff, Mary Gee, both her life estate and distributive share in real and personal property, despite the late renunciation of her first husband’s will. In his opinion Wythe reasoned "that the appellee, Mary Gee, by failure to renounce the benefit (if it were a benefit) bestowed upon her, by her former husband in his testament, was not barred of her dower in his lands, nor her share of his goods." The Court of Appeals reversed.
See also
References
- ↑ Daniel Call, Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, (Richmond: R. I. Smith, 1833), 481.
