http://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=Fwding&feedformat=atomWythepedia: The George Wythe Encyclopedia - User contributions [en]2024-03-29T10:50:04ZUser contributionsMediaWiki 1.27.5http://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=James_Madison,_Bishop&diff=71244James Madison, Bishop2020-11-12T20:54:32Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{PersonInfoBox<br />
|imagename=BishopJamesMadison.jpg<br />
|name=James Madison<br />
|honorific=The Right Reverend Dr.<br />
|1stoffice=Bishop, Episcopal Diocese of Virginia<br />
|1stofficedates=1790 &ndash; 1812<br />
|1stofficepreceded=Inaugural holder<br />
|1stofficesucceeded=<br />
|2ndoffice=President, College of William & Mary<br />
|2ndofficedates=1777 &ndash; 1812<br />
|2ndofficepreceded=John Camm<br />
|2ndofficesucceeded=John Bracken<br />
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|borndate=August 27, 1749<br />
|bornplace=<br />
|dieddate=March 6, 1812<br />
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|education=<br />
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|relatives=John Madison (father)<br />Agatha Strother (mother)<br />[[wikipedia:James Madison|James Madison, Jr.]] (cousin)<br />
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}}James Madison (1749 &ndash; 1812) was president of the [http://www.wm.edu/ College of William &amp; Mary] from 1777 to 1812, first bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Virginia, and a cousin of [[wikipedia:James Madison|James Madison, Jr.]], later the fourth President of the United States.<br />
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Bishop Madison attended the College of William &amp; Mary, graduating with high honors in 1771. After studying with [[George Wythe]], he was admitted to the bar but never chose to pursue a legal career. Instead, in 1773, he was elected professor of natural philosophy and mathematics at the college. After a brief stint in England to further his studies and seek ordination to the ministry of the Church of England, he returned to Williamsburg and his position as a professor at the college. In 1777, the Board of Visitors elected him president of the college, a position he would hold until his death. In 1779, he worked with [[Thomas Jefferson]] (then Governor of Virginia and a member of the college's Board of Visitors), to create the position of [[Professor of Law and Police]] at William &amp; Mary.<br />
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Following the Revolution, Madison played an instrumental role in the reorganization of the Episcopal Church in Virginia and was elected bishop in 1790. Madison died on March 6, 1812 and was buried in the chapel at the College of William &amp; Mary.<br />
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Madison ardently advocated for his vision of the new United States as a “Republic of Virtue” created by God to implement “the divine principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity”. This vision, however, did not include the immediate abolition of slavery.<ref>Charles Crowe, "Bishop James Madison and the Republic of Virtue", ''The Journal of Southern History'', 30, no. 1 (Feb. 1964): 59, 63-64.</ref><br />
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Madison became President of the College of William & Mary during bleak financial times – the Revolutionary War had deprived the College of most of its income, which came from the British crown. Madison authorized the College to sell most of the slaves from a plantation it owned in order to raise funds and relocated the rest to the College’s campus. The College also hired out some of its slaves “for Tobacco<ref>Promissory notes payable in tobacco were a common currency in Virginia at the time. Emily Jones Salmon and John Salmon, [https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/tobacco_in_colonial_virginia "Tobacco in Colonial Virginia"], ''Encyclopedia Virginia''.</ref> or other Country produce” . Madison assumed that the College’s slaves would try to escape to the British side during the war, so he relocated them to prevent that.<ref>Jennifer Oast, ''Institutional Slavery'' (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016), 147-51.</ref> <br />
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The Episcopal Church of Virginia also benefited from slavery in the post-Revolutionary years; much of its income came from donations by parishioners, and most of those donations came from income derived from slave labor. Bishop Madison also personally owned slaves, as did the three bishops who succeeded him.<ref>Diocese of Virginia Committee on Race and Reconciliation, [https://www.episcopalarchives.org/sites/default/files/anti-racism/dioceses/Virginia_Study.pdf ''Meet Me in Galilee… Beginning the Journey from Repentance to Reconciliation: A History of Racism and Race in the Diocese of Virginia''] (2012), 26-27.</ref><br />
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One of his students, abolitionist Edward Coles, asked Madison how he could reconcile his lectures on equality and the rights of man with the continued existence of slavery; Madison admitted he could not, and stated that the United States could only tolerate slavery because it was already in place and would be difficult to eliminate. Madison expressed a strong hope to Coles that Virginia would abolish slavery, but the Bishop had no plans to free his slaves before then.<ref>Ralph L. Ketcham, "The Dictates of Conscience: Edward Coles and Slavery", ''Virginia Quarterly Review'', 36, no. 1 (Winter 1960): 47-48.</ref><br />
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[[Category:Wythe's Students]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Graham_v._Woodson&diff=65742Graham v. Woodson2018-03-14T15:59:04Z<p>Fwding: Changed "tenet" to "tenant" in summary paragraph before Background</p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Graham v. Woodson''}}<br />
[[File:CallsReports1854V2GrahamvWoodson.pdf|link=Media:CallsReports1854V2GrahamvWoodson.pdf|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReports1854V2GrahamvWoodson.pdf|''Graham v. Woodson'']], in [https://catalog.swem.wm.edu/law/Record/2099031 ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Daniel Call. 3rd ed., ed. Lucian Minor. Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.]]<br />
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[[Media:CallsReports1854V2GrahamvWoodson.pdf|''Graham v. Woodson'']], 6 Va. (2 Call) 249 (1800),<br />
<ref>Daniel Call, ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appealed of Virgina,'' 3rd ed, ed. Lucian Minor (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854), 2:249.</ref> was a case where the court determined whether a tenant, who purchased the property, could also exercise the early termination provision of his lease. <br />
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==Background==<br />
Mathew Woodson leased to Graham Woodson some coal mines in Goochland for 20 years. In the lease there was an early termination provision for 5 shillings. In his will, Matthew left the rent of the leased property to his daughters with the remainder of the property after the 20 years to be bestowed to his son, Philip. Upon Matthew’s death, Philip sold the coal mines to Graham, who then payed the 5 shillings to terminate his lease agreement and take over the coal mines in fee simple. This case was brought by Mathew’s Woodson’s daughters for the loss of their interest in the coal mines. The plaintiff’s argued that the intent of their father was to at least provide rent to his daughters to sustain them, not allow Graham a way to purchase the coal mines under its value.<br />
===The Court's Decision===<br />
The Court of Chancery determined that Graham should pay the rent with interest. However, if he wanted to terminate his lease prior to the 20 years he could do so but must return the property to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed.<br />
==See also==<br />
*[[Wythe's Judicial Career]]<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/><br />
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[[Category: Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Alexander_v._Morris&diff=65720Alexander v. Morris2018-03-14T14:06:20Z<p>Fwding: Edited "Framers General" to "Farmers General" in Background para., third sentence.</p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Alexander v. Morris''}}<br />
[[File:CallAlexanderVMorris1854v3p88.jpg|link={{file path:CallsReports1854V3AlexandervMorris.pdf}}|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReports1854V3AlexandervMorris.pdf|''Alexander v. Morris'']], in [https://catalog.swem.wm.edu/law/Record/2099031 ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Daniel Call. 3rd ed. Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.]]<br />
<br />
[[Media:CallsReports1854V3AlexandervMorris.pdf|''Alexander v. Morris'']], 7 Va. 88, 3 Call 89 (1801),<ref>Daniel Call, ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia,'' 3rd ed., ed. Lucian Minor (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854), 3:88. [[George Wythe]] owned the [[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia|first edition]] of this set.</ref> was a case involving a contract dispute over the shipment of tobacco.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
In November 1783, William Alexander and his son-in-law, Jonathan Williams, agreed to work for the Farmers General of France. Alexander moved to Virginia to supply Farmers General with tobacco, and Williams settled in France to receive the shipments. In March 1784, Alexander asked Robert Morris to be his shipping partner. According to the agreement, Morris shared one third of the company's gains and losses, but did not receive additional funds for costs incurred or services provided outside of business expenses. In 1786, Morris entered an optional contract with Farmers General for an additional shipment of tobacco. Although Morris used his personal funds to send the additional shipment, the terms of his contract entitled Alexander to a share in the profits of the shipment, but not the expenses. After fulfilling the optional contract, Morris found himself with bad credit and a heap of debt, due in part to paying Alexander his share in the shipment. Morris sued Alexander in the High Court of Chancery to compel Alexander to pay the balance of his debt plus military certificates Alexander obtained with Morris's profits. Morris argued that it was inequitable for him to go into debt for the shipment while Alexander made a considerable sum of money.<br />
===The Court's Decision===<br />
[[George Wythe|Chancellor Wythe]] rejected the claim that Morris should be entitled to the military certificates, but ultimately declared in Morris's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.<br />
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==See also==<br />
*[[Wythe's Judicial Career]]<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/><br />
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[[Category: Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Yates_v._Salle&diff=65716Yates v. Salle2018-03-13T18:02:08Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Yates v. Salle''}}<br />
[[File:WytheYatesVSalle1852.jpg|link=Media:WytheDecisions1852YatesVSalle.pdf|thumb|right|400px|First page of the opinion ''[[Media:WytheDecisions1852YatesVSalle.pdf|Yates v. Salle]]'', in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
''[[Media:WytheDecisions1852YatesVSalle.pdf|Yates v. Salle]]'', Wythe 163 (1792),<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852): 163.</ref> ''rev'd in part and remanded in part'', [[Media:WashingtonsReportsSalleevYates1833v1.pdf|''Sallee v. Yates'']], 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 226 (1793),<ref>Bushrod Washington, ''[[Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of Virginia]],'' (Richmond: T. Nicolson, 1799), 1:226.</ref> discussed whether an heir's guardian and the executors of a person's estate breached their duty to that heir and to the will's author.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Benjamin Harris I had six daughters (Mary, Hinson, Phoebe, Edith, Sarah, and Nancy) and two sons (Benjamin II and William). In his will, Benjamin I left each of his daughters £100 payable within twelve months of the daughter turning eighteen or marrying, plus £200 payable when it "could be conveniently raised from the profits of his estate, to be paid at the discretion of his executors." Benjamin I died in September 1776. Defendants Abraham Salle, Edward Moseley, and Bernard Markham were named executors of Benjamin I's estate.<br />
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In 1777, Virginia paper currency entered a period of large and rapid devaluation that lasted several years.<ref>''See'' Emory G. Evans, "Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia, 1776 to 1796", ''William and Mary Quarterly 3d'' 28(3): 352 (1971).</ref><br />
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In August 1777, Sarah, the plaintiff, turned 18 and named Salle her guardian. At some point before the case came before [[George Wythe|Wythe]], Sarah married the other plaintiff, William Yates.<ref>During Wythe's time, a woman's legal identity merged with her husband's upon marriage. William Blackstone and St. George Tucker, ''Blackstone's with Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of Virginia,'' (Philadelphia: Wm. Young Birch and Abraham Small, 1803): Vol. 2, p. 441.</ref><br />
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On September 12, 1778, Moseley and Markham offered Salle £100 in Virginia paper currency for the first part of Sarah's inheritance. On August 31, 1779, Moseley and Markham offered Salle £200 in Virginia paper currency to settle the final part of Sarah's inheritance. Salle initially resisted the payment, since rapid devaluation meant that the paper currency payment would be practically worthless.<ref>Virginia paper money by this point was worth roughly 1/1000 of its value from when Benjamin I died. ''Sallee v. Yates'', 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 226 (1793).</ref> In the end, though, Salle believed himself legally required to accept the payment in Virginia paper and did so. None of Sarah's siblings had their inheritances likewise devalued. <br />
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When Sarah turned 21<ref>The "full age" (age of majority) in Virginia then was 21. Blackstone and Tucker (1803): Vol. 2, p. 463. Before then, the child's father or appointed guardian still had power over the child's property. Blackstone and Tucker (1803): Vol. 2, p. 453.</ref> in 1781, Salle offered her the £300, but she refused to accept it. Sarah filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery asking it to make Benjamin I's estate pay her the true value of her inheritance (i.e., the monetary equivalent of £300 from the time of Benjamin I's death).<br />
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In their answer to Sarah's bill, Moseley and Markham said they felt duty-bound to pay Sarah her inheritance as soon as the estate had enough money to do so, and that by now they had already given most of the estate's property to the other heirs. Markam added that he had advised Sarah not to take her inheritance, but she said she wanted to so that she could begin earning interest on it.<br />
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Benjamin II and William were also named as defendants, and in their answer they said that the payments to Sarah were proper because Benjamin I's estate suffered monetary losses from taking payments in Virginia paper currency while selling its property.<br />
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''Yates v. Salle'' was reported as a [[Between Yates and Salle|supplemental pamphlet]] in 1796 or later,<ref>George Wythe, [[Between Yates and Salle|''Between William Yates and Sarah his Wife, Plaintiffs, and Abraham Salle, Bernard Markham, Edward Moseley, Benjamin Harris, and William Wager Harris, Defendents'' [''sic''], ]](Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1796?).</ref> most likely printed by Thomas Nicolson of Richmond, Virginia, who had published [[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Wythe's Reports]] in 1795.<ref>Charles Evans, ''[[American Bibliography]],'' vol. 11 (1942), 122.</ref><br />
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==The Chancery Court's Decision==<br />
On September 26, 1792, Wythe issued a decree ordering Salle, Moseley, and Markham to pay Sarah the true value of her £300 inheritance plus interest from the time Sarah was entitled to it, minus the payments already made to Salle as Sarah's guardian. <br />
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Wythe said that Benjamin I's will makes it obvious that he meant for Sarah's inheritance to have the value it did when he wrote the will. There was no way Benjamin I could know that the value of Virginia paper money would plummet after he died. Benjamin I's will included methods for adjusting the inheritances' value: Mary received a bed and furniture or ten pounds, and Benjamin II was supposed to pay William £300 if Benjamin II's inheritance ended up being worth more than William's. On top of that, Benjamin I's will said the inheritance should be paid when it "could be CONVENIENTLY raised from the profits of his estate, to be paid at the DISCRETION of his executors." ''(caps Wythe's)''<ref>Wythe uses ALL CAPS several times in this opinion for emphasis and to illustrate terms he finds especially important.</ref> By paying Sarah's inheritance as soon as possible without raising funds to give her its true value (e.g., by selling property from the estate), Moseley and Markham did not properly carry out Benjamin I's will.<br />
[[File:WashingtonSalleevYates1799v1p226.jpg|link={{filename:WashingtonsReportsSalleevYates1833v1.pdf}}|thumb|left|400px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WashingtonsReportsSalleevYates1833v1.pdf|''Sallee v. Yates'']], in [http://wm-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA21560662660003196 ''Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Bushrod Washington. Richmond: T. Nicolson, 1799.]]<br />
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Wythe noted that Salle and Markham obviously knew that Sarah would lose a lot of money if her inheritance were paid in Virginia paper money during 1778-79; Salle was reluctant to accept the payment, and Markham warned Sarah against taking her inheritance then. A witness said that Moseley arranged some of the daughters' payments so that the sons would get as much of Benjamin I's estate as possible. Moseley's actions flew in the face of the maxim from [[Corpus Juris Civilis|Justinian's ''Digest'']] that no one should profit by harming someone else.<ref>''jure naturae aequum est, neminem, cum alterius detrimento et injuria, fieri locupletiorem'' ("it is just and in accordance with natural law that no one can enrich themselves by injuring or causing detriment to another.") Just. Dig. 50.27.206.</ref> <br />
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As executors, Salle, Markham, and Moseley's duties were to treat all the heirs equally. Wythe said what Moseley did would be even more distasteful if he were Hinson's husband (which had been alleged but apparently not proven to Wythe's satisfaction). Hinson received her inheritance in 1776, before Virginia paper currency took a nosedive in value. Wythe wished that Salle, Markham, or Moseley had shown the same dedication Nancy's guardian Thomas Harris did. Salle, Markham, and Moseley tried to force Harris to accept Nancy's payment in devalued paper money as well, but Harris refused and held out until the executors paid him the true value of Nancy's inheritance. Restoring Sarah's situation to where it would have been had Salle, Markham, and Moseley been more diligent in their duties, Wythe said, was one of the main reasons for equity's existence, especially if fraud was involved.<br />
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Wythe dismissed Salle's excuse that he was compelled to accept the paper money as payment for Sarah's inheritance. The Virginia Assembly did pass a law in 1777<ref>Wythe does not specify, but he seems to be referring to Ch. 8, 9 Hening 297 (May 1777 Session).</ref> requiring people to accept devalued paper money as payment, but the only penalty for demanding payment for the debt's original value was that the creditor could not get interest on the original debt.<ref>Ch. 8, Sec. 4, 9 Hening at 298.</ref> If Moseley and Markham forced Salle to accept the devalued paper money, then they breached their duty as executors, and were also favoring some heirs over others; they agreed to give Nancy the true value of her inheritance after initially trying to make her accept devalued paper money as payment.<br />
<br />
Wythe also recognizes that the Virginia Assembly passed a law in 1781<ref>Ch. 22, 10 Hening 471 (Nov. 1781 Session).</ref> requiring the holders of debts, contracts, and obligations to accept devalued Virginia paper money as payment in full. However, Wythe believed that the 1781 Act did not apply in this situation because an inheritance is not a debt, contract, or obligation; an inheritance is merely a benevolent gift. If a testator (the person who dies and leaves property to someone in a will) creates a will giving someone property, the testator is under no obligation to maintain that gift, because they can change their gifts as many times as they like before dying. There is no obligation, so there is not contract. Once a testator dies, they are no longer legally competent to create a debt, obligation, or contract. In the headnotes preceding the case, Wythe also emphasizes that this law was passed after Moseley and Markham made their full payment to Salle.<br />
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Even if an inheritance were considered a debt, obligation, or contract, the 1781 Act would not cover it because this payment was fraudulently submitted by the executors to enrich other heirs and illegitimately accepted by Salle out of fear.<br />
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The defendants appealed Wythe's decree to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<br />
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==The Supreme Court of Appeals's Decision==<br />
The Supreme Court reversed Wythe.<ref>''Sallee v. Yates'', 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 226 (1793).</ref> The bills against Markham, Moseley, Benjamin II, and William were dismissed, and Salle was ordered to account for the money he had already received as Sarah's guardian, then pay that money to Sarah. The court ordered Sarah to pay Markham, Moseley, Salle, Benjamin II, and William the costs of appealing the decision in the Supreme Court, and each side to pay its own costs in the Chancery Court.<br />
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Supreme Court President Edmund Pendleton said that "this is certainly a very hard case", but that the 1781 Act meant that Sarah had to accept the devalued Virginia paper currency as payment in full for her inheritance. Even a court in equity, Pendleton said, is bound by this Act.<ref>Apparently even Pendleton's biographer thought that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result here. Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'': 263 (1986), ''citing'' David J. Mays, ''Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803'' (Cambridge, MA, 1952): Vol. 2, p. 293.</ref><br />
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==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe appeared extremely irate over the Supreme Court's reversal. He said that he thought his decree would hold up in the court of Minos, a reference to the supreme judge of the underworld in Dante's ''Inferno'',<ref>"so righteous a sentence as that it would be approved, even in that tribunal where ''Quaesitor Minos urnam movet'' ("someone who seeks to shake Minos's urn")." Wythe 171, ''citing'' Dante, ''Inferno'', Circle 2, Canto 5. In the ''Inferno'', Minos was charged with ensuring that a soul's account of its life matched up with the record in his urn, which listed all human destinies. Minos would shake his urn to summon the jury that would reveal the actions that soul had taken during its lifetime. ''See'' [http://danteworlds.laits.utexas.edu/circle2.html Danteworlds].</ref> but instead the Supreme Court announced its "damnation".<br />
<br />
Early on, he states that he did not issue his decree "as hath been supposed, by compassion for an orphan CONFESSED to have been INJURED by those who ought to have protected her", ''(caps Wythe's)'' adding in a footnote that "(t)his motive was ascribed to him when the decree was condemned."<ref>Wythe 166. Other than a comment about "having maturely considered" the case and noting that their decision would harm Sarah, there does not seem to be anything in the Supreme Court's opinion that says or implies this. Perhaps other words were spoken or published out of court?</ref> <br />
<br />
==Works Cited or Referenced by Wythe==<br />
===Justinian's ''Digest''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">...which design was contrary to the maxim ''iure naturae aequum est, neminem, cum alterius detrimento et iniuria, fieri locupletiorem,'' (Dig. Lib. L tit. XVII. Reg. CCVI)...</span></tt> Translation: ''[B]y the law of nature it is just that no one be made wealthy with the detriment and injury of another.''<ref>Ibid, 168.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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For this quotation, Wythe most likely used his copy of the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' which includes the ''Digest of Justinian''.<br />
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===Virgil's ''Aeneid''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">Upon these considerations, the decree was thought to be so righteous a sentence as that it would be approved, even in that tribunal where a ''Quaesitor Minos urnam movet''...</span></tt> Translation: ''Judge Minos shakes the urn.'' In the Aeneid, Minos was the judge of those who were given the death penalty on a false charge. Minos resided in the underworld, with a gigantic urn, and decided whether a soul should go to Elysium or Tartarus.<ref>Ibid, 171.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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==See also==<br />
*[[Between Yates and Salle]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Braxton&diff=65712Love v. Braxton2018-03-13T17:29:06Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Braxton''}}<br />
[[File:WytheLoveVBraxton1852.jpg|link={{file path:WytheDecisions1852LoveVBraxton.pdf}}|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852LoveVBraxton.pdf|''Love v. Braxton'']], in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
''Love v. Braxton'', [[Media:WytheDecisions1852LoveVBraxton.pdf|Wythe 144 (1792)]],<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 144.</ref> ''subsequent history at'' [[Media:CallsReportsLovevBraxtonv51805.pdf|9 Va. (5 Call) 537 (1805)]],<ref>Daniel Call, ''Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'' (Richmond: Robert I. Smith, 1833) 5:537. [[George Wythe]] owned the [[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia|first edition]] of this set.</ref> discussed whether a Virginia court could hear a dispute over the purchase of land in Great Britain.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Alexander Love had an agreement to buy a London estate from Carter Braxton, but before he could complete the purchase, Thomas Ham purchased it instead. Love claimed that Ham had notice of Love's agreement with Braxton, and sued for damages. All parties presumably resided in Virginia, although the case does not state where they were domiciled.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
The High Court of Chancery said that it could not force Ham to give the estate to Love since it was in Great Britain, but Love should not be forced to resort to British courts to get compensation for his injuries. The Court ruled that Love should be allowed to proceed with his case, and if he proves that Ham had notice of Love and Braxton's agreement before Ham completed his purchase, then Ham should compensate Love accordingly.<br />
<br />
==Subsequent history==<br />
After Wythe's ruling, the case went to a jury. Wythe set aside the first jury verdict in Braxton's favor as indecisive and ordered a new jury trial. The second jury ruled for Love; Wythe set aside the second verdict and dismissed the case on the merits after Braxton filed an affidavit from a witness stating that the second verdict was actually averaged out among the different opinions of the twelve jurors.<ref>''Love'', 9 Va. at 537-38.</ref> <br />
<br />
Love appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld Wythe's decision. Judges Fleming and Carrington said that because there was no conflict among the witnesses or in the evidence, Wythe was free to set aside the jury's verdict if he was dissatisfied with it.<ref>''Love'', 9 Va. at 542.</ref> Judge Roane dissented, stating that some testimony contradicted other testimony, and that Wythe should therefore have deferred to the jury's verdict.<ref>''Love'', 9 Va. at 541-42.</ref><br />
<br />
[[File:CallLovevBraxton1833v5p537.jpg|link={{filepath:CallsReportsLovevBraxtonv51805.pdf}}|thumb|left|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReportsLovevBraxtonv51805.pdf|''Love v. Braxton'']], in ''Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'' (Richmond: Robert I. Smith, 1833).]]<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Pendleton_v._Lomax&diff=65554Pendleton v. Lomax2018-03-12T21:39:53Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Pendleton v. Lomax''}}<br />
[[File:WythePendletonVLomax1852.jpg|link={{filename:WytheDecisions1852PendletonVLomax.pdf}}|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852PendletonVLomax.pdf|''Pendleton v. Lomax'']], in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
[[Media:WytheDecisions1852PendletonVLomax.pdf|''Pendleton v. Lomax'']], Wythe 4 (1790),<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 4.</ref> ''adjourned to'' [[Media:CallLomaxvPendleton1854v3.pdf|''Lomax v. Pendleton'']], 7 Va. (3 Call) 538 (1790)<ref>Daniel Call, ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'' (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854): 3:538. George Wythe owned the [[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia|first edition]] of this set.</ref> was a case originally appealed to the High Court of Chancery from the Caroline County Court. The plaintiff was one of the chancellors, however, and the remaining two chancellors split, so the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
In May 1753, [[Edmund Pendleton]] signed with Lunsford Lomax as co-sureties on a bill of exchange for debts incurred by Thomas Wyld. In exchange, in June 1753, Wyld gave Pendleton the power of attorney to sell Wyld's estate in trust and to collect on all debts due Wyld in order to repay the debts Wyld owed others. The sale of Wyld's estate and collection of debts owed Wyld were not nearly enough to cover Wyld's debts; Wyld still owed £531 to creditors. In November 1756, Wyld's creditor made a claim on the bill of exchange, and Pendleton gave his own bond to the creditors to settle Wyld's debt.<br />
<br />
In 1766, Pendleton demanded Lomax pay one-half of the remaining debt that Pendleton had given a bond for. Lomax refused to pay, so Pendleton sued in 1768. Lomax moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute of limitations had expired; Pendleton claimed that the process of selling Wyld's estate, and thereby establishing how much of Wyld's debt remained after the sale, caused the delay in filing suit, and that therefore his case was not time-barred. While the case was in county court, Lunsford Lomax died, and Thomas Lomax, the estate's administrator, took Lunsford's place as defendant. The county court rejected Lomax's statute of limitations claim, and Lomax appealed to the High Court of Chancery. <br />
<br />
Chancellor Pendleton did not hear the case, as he was on the other side of the bench as the plaintiff. One of the chancellors held that Pendleton's cause of action originated in November 1756 when Pendleton gave his bond for Wyld's remaining debts, meaning that the statute of limitations barred Pendleton's cause of action. The other chancellor was leaning towards allowing Pendleton's suit to proceed.<ref>In his account of the case, Wythe does not state which chancellor held each point of view, simply referring to "another" and "the third judge". Wythe's remarks on the opinion, however, offer some useful hints as to where Wythe's thought lay.</ref> The High Court of Chancery appeared to be headed towards a split decision, so they referred the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations did not bar Pendleton's cause of action.<br />
[[File:CallLomaxvPendleton1854v3p538.jpg|link={{filename:CallLomaxvPendleton1854v3.pdf}}|thumb|left|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallLomaxvPendleton1854v3.pdf|''Lomax v. Pendleton'']], in ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'', by Daniel Call. 3rd ed. (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.)]] <br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
[[George Wythe|Wythe]] stated that Pendleton's cause of action began when he issued a note in November 1753 to Wyld's creditors erasing Wyld's debt. In Wythe's view, Wyld's transfer of his estate and accounts receivable to Pendleton, and Pendleton's sale of Wyld's property, had nothing to do with Lomax. In fact, Wythe continues, nothing in the record indicated that Lomax knew that a claim had been made on the bill of exchange until Pendleton took action in 1766 to recover half of the debt. Under such circumstances, Wythe wryly stated, "the plea of the statute for limitation of actions in this case would be thought by some to be a legal and conscientious defense, if better judges had not determined the contrary."<ref>Wythe 9.</ref><br />
<br />
==Works Cited or Referenced by Wythe==<br />
===Justinian's ''Codex''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''Cum alter ex fideiussoribus in solidum debito satisfaciat, actio ei adversus eum qui una fideiussit non competit. Potuisti sane, cum fisco solveres, desiderare, ut ius pignoris quod fiscus habuit in te transferretur, et si hoc ita factum est, cessis actionibus uti poteris. quod et in privatis debitis observandum est.'' C. l. VIII. tit. XLI. l. XI. </span></tt><ref>Ibid, 8. </ref> Translation: ''When one of two guarantors satisfies the debt in full, an action for him against the one who co-guaranteed does not exist. Certainly you are able, when you loosen the treasury, to request that the right of pledge which the treasury holds, is transferred unto you, and if it is done in this way, you will be able to make use of the conceded actions, which also is observed in private debts.''</blockquote><br />
<br />
===Justinian's ''Digest''===<br />
Quotes in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">...''(b)'' for, in the first case, the creditor, when he received his money from the surety ''non in solum accepit'', did not receive payment...</span></tt> Translation: ''Not accepted as freeing [the debtor from obligations to the creditor].''<ref>Ibid.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''Fideiussoribus succurri solet, ut stipulator compellatur ei, qui solidum solvere paratus est, vendere ceterorum nomina.'' Dig. l. XLVI. tit. 1. l. XVII.</span></tt> Translation: ''It is customary to give aid to guarantors, so that the stipulator is compelled to sell the names of others [i.e. other debts he might be owed] to him, who is prepared to pay the debt.''<ref>Ibid.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''Cum is, qui et reum et fideiussores habens, ab uno ex fideiussoribus, accepta pecunia praestat actiones, poterit quidem dici nullas iam esse: cum suum perceperit, et perceptione omnes liberati sunt, sed non ita est, non enim in solutum accipit, sed quodammodo nomen debitoris vendidit, et ideo habet actiones, quia tenetur ad id ipsum, ut praestet actiones.'' Dig. lib. XLVI. tit. 1. l. XXXVI.</span></tt> Translation: ''When someone, who, having both a debtor and guarantors, with money having been accepted from one of the guarantors, hands over his actions, it could certainly be said that now there is nothing, since he will have received his [debt] all are free by his reception. But it is not thus: for he did not receive it in a free manner, but, as it were, he sold the name of the debtor [i.e. the account], and still has the actions, because he is bound to that himself, so he might transfer the actions.''<ref>Ibid.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
For these quotes, Wythe most likely used his copy of the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' which includes the ''Digest of Justinian''.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Southall_v._M%27Keand&diff=65552Southall v. M'Keand2018-03-12T21:34:40Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Southall v. M'Keand''}}<br />
[[File:WytheSouthallVMKeand1852.jpg|link=Media:WytheDecisions1852SouthallVMKeand.pdf|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852SouthallVMKeand.pdf|''Southall v. M'Keand'']], in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
<br />
''Southall v. M'Keand'', [[Media:WytheDecisions1852SouthallVMKeand.pdf|Wythe 95 (1791)]],<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 95.</ref> ''rev'd in part, vacated in part'', [[Media:WashingtonsReports1799V2HarrisonvField.pdf|1 Va. (1 Wash.) 336 (1794)]],<ref>Bushrod Washington, ''[[Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of Virginia]],'' (Richmond: T. Nicolson, 1799), 1:336.</ref> was a case involving a dispute over a parcel of land in Richmond that was a prize in a lottery William Byrd III held to help pay his debts.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
William Byrd III held a lottery in 1767 to help pay off some debts he had accumulated.<ref>"William Byrd III", ''The Colonial Williamsburg Official History & Citizenship Site'', http://www.history.org/almanack/people/bios/biowbyrd.cfm</ref> Prizes in this lottery were parcels of land taken from Byrd's holdings in Richmond. Byrd divided his holdings into unimproved lots, which would be awarded in half-acre portions; and improved lots, which were occupied tenements. The occupied lots' tenants had improved their lots to various degrees, and some tenants occupied more than half an acre of land. M'Keand was one of the tenants.<br />
<br />
After the lottery tickets were sold but before the drawing, Byrd started surveying and laying out the lots, intending to reduce the size of the improved lots to half an acre each. Byrd's tenants objected to that plan, so most of the improved lots were awarded according to whatever amount of property their tenant had occupied. M'Keand did not object to the reduction, so his tenement as given away in the lottery was reduced to half an acre. Some previous tenants in M'Keand's tenement had occupied extra land adjacent to that half-acre lot; Byrd sold this adjacent land to M'Keand, who later sold it to Powell, who in turn sold the land to Mayo, who further sold the land to Carter.<br />
<br />
Southall won M'Keand's tenement in the lottery. Southall believed that his prize included the adjacent occupied land to M'Keand's half-acre lot. Southall quickly notified M'Keand that Southall claimed the adjacent land to the half-acre lot, but Southall did not file a bill in Henrico County Court to enforce his claim until nearly 15 years later, after M'Keand had made £1000 worth of improvements to the land.<br />
<br />
The Henrico County Court dismissed Southall's bill, and Southall appealed to the High Court of Chancery.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
The High Court of Chancery ordered a survey to be made of the disputed land and given to a District Court jury, along with a plan for the City of Richmond (which indicated that the land attached to the winning lottery ticket would be half an acre in size), and ordered the District Court jury to determine the boundaries of M'Keand's tenement. After a hung jury, the second jury determined that the City of Richmond plan properly set out the area attached to the lot, and found in favor of M'Keand. The District Court judge, however, entered a verdict certifying that the evidence favored Southall. The High Court of Chancery voiced its approval of the District Court verdict, but also stated that the plan posted by Byrd for the City of Richmond was fair and that the parties should therefore be bound by it. As a consequence, the High Court of Chancery held that Southall was not entitled to the adjacent land purchased by M'Keand as a matter of equity, and upheld the County Court's decision dismissing Southall's bill.<br />
<br />
Southall appealed the High Court of Chancery's decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.<ref>''Southall v. M'Keand'', 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 336 (1794)</ref> The Supreme Court of Appeals held that Southall was entitled to the full bounds of the area occupied by M'Keand, not just the half-acre parceled out by Byrd, since that was the agreement Byrd had reached with the other, objecting tenants, and an observer from a distance such as Southall had no reason to know that M'Keand specifically hadn't objected. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeals said, M'Keand had notice of Southall's claim. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals continued, since Southall waited so long to enforce his claim in court, he was not entitled to the extra value M'Keand had added to the land in the meantime. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeals said, Southall was entitled to the value of the land at the time M'Keand bought it from Byrd. Since Powell was not aware of the cloud surrounding the title to the land, the Supreme Court of Appeals said, Southall had no claim against him Powell or Mayo. Since M'Keand was dead by the time of the Supreme Court of Appeals's decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals remanded the case to the High Court of Chancery to revive Southall's claim against M'Keand's estate.<br />
[[File:WashingtonSouthallvM'Keand1794v1p336.jpg|link={{filename:WashingtonsReportsSouthallvM'Keand1794.pdf}}|thumb|left|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WashingtonsReportsSouthallvM'Keand1794.pdf|''Southall v. M'Keand'']], in [http://wm-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA21560662660003196 ''Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Bushrod Washington. Richmond: T. Nicolson, 1799.]]<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe's commentary for this case provides a good example of his pedantic writing style; he enters into an almost line-by-line dissection of the Supreme Court of Appeals's opinion. He criticizes the Supreme Court of Appeals's statement that the District Court's verdict shouldn't be considered to settle the issue of where the boundaries of Southall's property lie, since the verdict was against the evidence. Wythe was also displeased with the Supreme Court of Appeals's comment that it was unusual for the High Court of Chancery to accept such a verdict. Wythe rhetorically asks the Supreme Court of Appeals if the Chancellor is bound to always agree with the District Court judge's interpretation of the facts. The editor of the Wythe's Decisions volume, though, notes that the Supreme Court of Appeals's comments were likely meaningless asides leading up to their statement that they would review the case de novo.<ref>Wythe 102.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe also takes issue with the Supreme Court of Appeals's assertion that all lottery winners, including Southall, had a right to expect that the prize would be the territory as occupied by its tenants, since tenants on that land prior to M'Keand kept a public tavern on some of the adjacent ground. Wythe pointed out that the plan on display in Williamsburg that described the lottery prize plots indicated that M'Keand's property only contained half an acre. Wythe argued that the prior tenants' occupation was not consistent enough to have attached the property to the M'Keand lot. <br />
<br />
Wythe also disagreed with the Supreme Court of Appeals's statement that Southall should not be bound by Byrd's survey reducing M'Keand's plot in the lottery to half an acre because neither Southall nor M'Keand were present to imply their consent to the scheme. Wythe argues that Byrd's survey was necessary in order for lottery entrants to know what land they were eligible to receive, and that it would have been practically impossible for Byrd to get the consent of all his tenants and lottery entrants before performing the survey. Wythe also noted that instead of being set aside as a separate plot in the lottery, the adjacent land to the M'Keand plot was included in the next plot over, which just happened to be awarded to a ticket held by William Byrd, who could then sell the land to M'Keand. If not for that luck of the draw, Wythe says, Southall would have been unable to file a claim on the land in court or in equity at all, and would have had to settle for trying to get monetary compensation from Byrd.<br />
<br />
Wythe then proceeds to give a narrative re-enactment of how he believes Byrd's lottery would have been carried out in order to show that there was no point to the Supreme Court of Appeals's discussion over whether copies of Byrd's plan for the City of Richmond should be allowed into evidence, since M'Keand had never objected to being included in the new boundaries as laid out by that plan.<br />
<br />
Wythe also notes that it would be worth figuring out some day whether equity would have provided relief for M'Keand in a situation where Southall had pursued his claim immediately in a court of common law, resulting in M'Keand losing both his purchased land and the value of improvements he made. <br />
<br />
Wythe concludes by pondering how the executors for M'Keand's estate will be attached to the suit.<br />
<br />
==Works Cited or Referenced by Wythe==<br />
<br />
===Henry Home Kames, ''Principles of Equity''===<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><br />
<span style="color: #006600;">"What Home has said, on this question, in his principles of equity, part I. sect II. art. I"</span><br />
</tt><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Fowler_v._Saunders&diff=65550Fowler v. Saunders2018-03-12T21:30:49Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Fowler v. Saunders''}}<br />
[[File:WytheFowlerVSaunders1852.jpg|link={{filename:WytheDecisions1852FowlerVSaunders.pdf}}|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852FowlerVSaunders.pdf|''Fowler v. Saunders'']], in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
''Fowler v. Saunders'', [[Media:WytheDecisions1852FowlerVSaunders.pdf|Wythe 322 (1798)]],<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 322.</ref> <em>rev'd</em>, [[Media:CallsReportsFowlervSaunders1833v4.pdf|8 Va. (4 Call) 361 (1798)]],<ref>Daniel Call, ''Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'' (Richmond: Robert I. Smith, 1833) 4:361. George Wythe owned the [[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia|first edition]] of this set.</ref> was a dispute over who owned slaves in which [[George Wythe|Wythe]] interpreted the intended meaning and application of Virginia statutes.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Thomas Sale sent his daughter, Susanna, and her husband, Alexander Saunders, a number of slaves following their marriage. In his will, Sale gave the Saunderses a life interest in those slaves and any children those slaves may produce. Upon Sale's death, the slaves and their descendants were to pass to his daughter's children. Susanna produced a daughter, Lucy Saunders, but later married William Fowler following Alexander Saunders's death. Fowler obtained possession of the slaves after the marriage. Instead of the slaves passing to Lucy after Sale died, the Fowlers retained possession. <br />
<br />
James Patterson, Lucy's guardian, supposedly claimed that Lucy was entitled to the slaves now that Sale had passed on as afforded to her in his will. The Fowlers filed suit in the High Court of Chancery to settle the issue. The court found in Lucy's favor, and affirmed the dispensations in Sale's will.<br />
<br />
''Fowler v. Saunders'' was reported as a [[Between Fowler and Saunders|supplemental pamphlet]] in 1798 or later,<ref>George Wythe, [[Between Fowler and Saunders|''Between William Fowler and Susanna His Wife, Plaintiffs, and, Lucy Saunders, an Infant, by James A. Patterson, Her Guardian, Defendent'' [''sic'']; ''Between Parke Goodall and John Clough, Plaintiffs, and, John Bullock, the Younger, Defendent'' [''sic'',] ]](Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1798?).</ref> printed by Thomas Nicolson of Richmond, Virginia, who had published [[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Wythe's Reports]] in 1795.<ref>Charles Evans, ''[[American Bibliography]],'' vol. 11 (1942), 122. Evans mistakenly reports the date of publication as 1796.</ref><br />
<br />
==The Chancery Court's Decision==<br />
In 1758 the Virginia legislature enacted a statute providing that a gift of slaves would not be valid without the provision of a writing passing title and right to those slaves.<ref>An Act for Preventing Fraudulent Gifts of Slaves, Sept. 1758, in 7 ''The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia'', 237 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1820).</ref> The statute was intended to prevent attempts to retain the legal rights to a group of slaves while at once dispensing of physical possession, an act which was deemed to defraud the public as to whom the slaves belonged.<br />
<br />
In 1787, the legislature passed a declaratory statute (intended to explain a previous law's meaning) stating that the 1758 Act did not require a gift of slaves to be confirmed in writing if it was a gift from a person to an heir, and if the heir kept possession of the slaves after the gift so that the heir was considered the slaves' owner. (Apparently up to that point many Virginia courts were ruling otherwise.)<ref>An Act to Explain and Amend the Acts for Preventing Fraudulent Gifts of Slaves, Oct. 1787, in 12 ''The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia'', 505 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1823).</ref><br />
<br />
Although the 1758 and 1787 statutes did not speak to cases in which the slaves were gifted or transferred in consideration of marriage, the court depended on them for its decision. Wythe said that the 1758 Act was only intended to prevent fraudulent situations where a person pretends to give away ownership of slaves while actually retaining it; the 1787 Act makes that clear. The Fowlers argued that they married before 1787, so that Act did not apply to them. Wythe said that because the 1787 Act was a declaratory act, it was only restating the law as it already was under the 1758 Act, rather than creating new law. (Wythe cited Francis Bacon's ''[[Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning]]'' as support.<ref>Francis Bacon, "Aphorism LI," in ''[[Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning]]'' (Oxford: Printed by Leon. Lichfield for Rob. Young & Ed. Forrest, 1640), 448.</ref>) Therefore, Sale's gift of the slaves to Alexander and Susanna Saunders was valid, even without a formal writing. <br />
<br />
The Fowlers also argued that the slaves were lent rather than gifted, but Wythe said that the burden was on the Fowlers to prove this, which they had not. The Court found that the slaves were a gift because Saunders took the slaves into his possession and exercised full dominion over them, so the default assumption is that Sale intended to give the slaves to Saunders. Having so determined, the Court required the Fowlers to deliver to Patterson the slaves conveyed by Sale, the slaves' children, and the profits generated by those slaves since Sale's death, with the exception of any rights Susanna might have inherited from Alexander.<ref>During Wythe's time, a woman's legal identity merged with her husband's upon marriage. William Blackstone and St. George Tucker, ''Blackstone's with Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of Virginia'', (Philadelphia: Wm. Young Birch and Abraham Small, 1803) 2:441. The editor of the second edition of Wythe's Reports noted that this still left an important question unanswered: exactly where did Lucy's right to the slaves come from? If it came from Sale's will, then Susanna would still have the right to the slaves during Susanna's lifetime. If Lucy's right was inherited through Alexander, then the right to the slaves immediately went to Lucy. Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court,'' 328, Footnote *.</ref><br />
[[File:CallFowlervSaunders1833v4p361.jpg|link={{filepath:CallsReportsFowlervSaunders1833v4.pdf}}|thumb|left|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReportsFowlervSaunders1833v4.pdf|''Fowler v. Saunders'']], in ''Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia'' (Richmond: Robert I. Smith, 1833).]]<br />
==In the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia==<br />
The Fowlers appealed Wythe's decision to the Virginia Supreme Court, which said that the facts were not sufficiently developed for a court to be able to decide the merits of the case.<ref>''Fowler v. Saunders'', 8 Va. 361 (1798).</ref> The Fowlers bill was a ''bill quia timet'' (a bill asking a court to enjoin a probable future harm<ref>"''Quia timet''", in ''Black's Law Dictionary'', 10th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2014), 1443.</ref>), but the Fowlers presented no evidence that there was any danger of Patterson actually trying to claim the slaves in Lucy's name. Supreme Court President Edumund Pendleton expressed doubt that Susanna had anything to do with the suit at all, and wondered aloud if the suit was a ploy by William Fowler to claim the slaves for himself.<ref>''Fowler v. Saunders'', 8 Va. at 363.</ref><br />
<br />
The Supreme Court ordered the Chancery Court to dismiss the Fowlers' bill, ordered Saunders to pay the Fowlers' court costs at the Supreme Court level, and ordered the Fowlers to pay Saunders's court costs at the Chancery Court level.<br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*[[Between Fowler and Saunders]]<br />
*[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions'']]<br />
*[[George Wythe and Slavery]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category: Cases]]<br />
[[Category: Slavery]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Braxton_v._Andrews&diff=65436Braxton v. Andrews2018-03-12T15:50:20Z<p>Fwding: Corrected Va. Reports cite</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Braxton v. Andrews''}}<br />
[[File:CallsReports1854V2BraxtonvAndrews.pdf|link=Media:CallsReports1854V2BraxtonvAndrews.pdf|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReports1854V2BraxtonvAndrews.pdf|''Braxton v. Andrews'']], in [https://catalog.swem.wm.edu/law/Record/2099031 ''Report of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Daniel Call. 3rd ed. Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.]]<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
[[Media:CallsReports1854V2BraxtonvAndrews.pdf|''Braxton v. Andrews'']], 6 Va. 357, 2 Call 357 (1799),<ref>Daniel Call, ''[[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia]],'' 3rd ed., ed. Lucian Minor (Richmond: A. Minor, 1854), 300.</ref> was a short case discussing whether a ''scire facias'' writ could be ordered against a Sergeant for escheating (reclaiming as state property) an individual’s estate. <br />
<br />
==Background==<br />
Braxton appealed from the Court of Chancery to the Court of Appeals, but died before his hearing. Since no one administered Braxton's estate, it was escheated to the city. A ''scire facias'' writ (a judicial writ requiring a defendant to appear in court and prove why an existing judgment should not be executed against him or her) was moved against the City Sergeant to revive the appeal.<br />
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===The Court's Decision===<br />
The Court of Appeals dismissed the case.<br />
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==See also==<br />
*[[Wythe's Judicial Career]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
<br />
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[[Category: Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Branch_v._Burnley&diff=65432Branch v. Burnley2018-03-12T15:49:03Z<p>Fwding: Corrected Va. Reports cite</p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Branch v. Burnley''}}<br />
[[File:CallsReports1854V1BranchvBurnley.pdf|link=Media:CallsReports1854V1BranchvBurnley.pdf|thumb|right|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReports1854V1BranchvBurnley.pdf|''Branch v. Burnley'']], in [https://catalog.swem.wm.edu/law/Record/2099031 ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia''], by Daniel Call. 3rd ed. Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.]]<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
[[Media:CallsReports1854V1BranchvBurnley.pdf|''Branch v. Burnley'']], 5 Va. 147, 1 Call 147 (1797), <ref>Daniel Call, ''[[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia]],'' 3rd. ed., ed. Lucian Minor (Richmond: A. Minor, 1854), 127.</ref> discussed whether an attorney at law may receive money recovered from the defendant and whether an attorney’s receipt could discharge a judgment.<br />
<br />
==Background==<br />
Burnley and Breckenridge hired an attorney, Briggs, to sue the Branch estate for a debt. In 1772, Briggs obtained a judgment on behalf of Burnely and Breckenridge. In 1774, a bond was given, however, in 1778, the Branch estate paid the judgment directly to Briggs, the attorney. After the war in 1787, Branch and Burnley went to court to collect on their bond. The court refused to enforce the judgment due to the pair's nine year delay in enforcing their right to collect the bond. Burnley and Breckenridge appealed to the District Court of Richmond claiming the delay was due to payment of their attorney, who held the bond in his office, rather than direct relief to themselves. The District Court found in favor of Burnley and Breckenridge and the Branch estate appealed to the Court of Chancery. The Branch estate requested an injunction stating that Briggs, as the attorney of the plantiffs, had the authority to accept payment on his client’s behalf. Chancellor Wythe agreed and awarded the injunction on the usual terms of releasing all errors at law. Burnley and Breckenridge responded to the judgment by demurring the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction.<br />
<br />
===The Court's Decision===<br />
Wythe dismissed the demure for want of equity. The Court of Appeals reversed finding that Wythe did not have jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals also found that Wythe's release of errors decision effectively prevented Burnley and Breckenridge from requesting a substantive appeal on the merits of the case.<br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*[[Wythe's Judicial Career]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
[[Category: Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Goodall_v._Bullock&diff=64586Goodall v. Bullock2018-03-08T19:26:49Z<p>Fwding: Edited citation to Goodall</p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Goodall v. Bullock''}}<br />
[[File:WytheGoodallVBullock1852.jpg|link=Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|thumb|right|400px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|''Goodall v. Bullock'']], in [https://catalog.libraries.wm.edu:443/01COWM_WM:EVERYTHING:01COWM_WM_ALMA51596402710003196 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
[[Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|''Goodall v. Bullock'']], Wythe 328 (1798),<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 328,</ref> <em>aff'd</em>, [[Media:CallsReports1854V3BullockvGoodall.pdf|''Bullock v. Goodall'']], 7 Va. (3 Call) 44 (1801),<ref>Daniel Call, ''[[Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia]],'' 3rd ed., ed. Lucian Minor (Richmond: A. Morris, 1854), 39.</ref>discussed whether a sheriff could be fined because his deputy did not finish executing a writ, even if the person who filed the writ is the person who asked the deputy not to finish executing it. The opinion is notable for Wythe's discussion of the principles underlying a court of equity's powers in which Wythe refers to several classical Greek and Roman sources and stories.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Parke Goodall was Sheriff of Hanover County, and John Clough was one of his deputies.<br />
<br />
John Bullock sued his father, who went by the same name, and won a judgment for about £497. Bullock the younger delivered a writ of ''fieri facias''<ref>A writ of ''fieri facias'' orders the sheriff to get goods from a person to satisfy a judgment against that person.</ref> to Clough in May 1792 to be executed against Bullock the elder's property. Clough seized Bullock the elder's entire estate under the writ and sold it to Bullock the younger in June 1792 for about £206.<br />
<br />
Clough never returned the writ to court with notations on what actions he had taken using the writ's power - a process called ''returning the execution''. Returning the execution could have led to further court proceedings against Bullock the elder. The reason for this was disputed. Clough said that in 1795 Bullock the younger asked him to delay returning the execution until the court costs were settled. To support Clough's claim, a third-party witness, William L. Thompson, said that they heard Bullock the younger say he wished Clough would not return the execution until the Bullocks settled with each other. Bullock the younger answered that he never asked Clough to delay returning the execution, but rather repeatedly asked Clough to return the execution after he had seized Bullock the elder's property.<br />
<br />
Bullock the younger sued Goodall and Clough in Hanover County Court for failure to return the execution of a writ, and on May 7, 1795, the court fined Goodall about £264 to be paid to Bullock the younger, under the authority of a 1791 Virginia statute. <br />
<br />
Clough successfully returned the execution in June 1795. Goodall successfully sued Clough to reimburse Goodall for the fine Goodall owed Bullock the younger. Goodall and Clough filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery asking it to permanently enjoin the Hanover County Court's judgment in favor of Bullock the younger, and Goodall agreed to wait to collect on his judgment against Clough until the proceedings in the Chancery Court concluded. <br />
<br />
Bullock the younger argued that because the 1791 statute gave the county court discretion in the amount of the fine to award, the Chancery Court would be improperly usurping the court of law's appellate jurisdiction by issuing an injunction. Therefore, Bullock the younger said, the Chancery Court should dismiss Goodall and Clough's case.<br />
<br />
''Goodall v. Bullock'' was reported as a [[Between Goodall and Bullock|supplemental pamphlet]] in 1798 or later,<ref>George Wythe, [[Between Goodall and Bullock|''Between William Fowler and Susanna His Wife, Plaintiffs, and, Lucy Saunders, an Infant, by James A. Patterson, Her Guardian, Defendent'' [''sic'']; ''Between Parke Goodall and John Clough, Plaintiffs, and, John Bullock, the Younger, Defendent'' [''sic'',] ]](Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1798?).</ref> printed by Thomas Nicolson of Richmond, Virginia, who had published [[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Wythe's Reports]] in 1795.<ref>Charles Evans, ''[[American Bibliography]],'' vol. 11 (1942), 122. Evans mistakenly reports the date of publication as 1796.</ref><br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
The High Court of Chancery issued permanent injunctions against Bullock the younger from collecting his judgment against Goodall, and against Goodall from collecting against Clough. The Court said that it was possible for both Thompson's and Bullock the younger's statements to be true. Bullock could have initially asked Clough to return the execution, but then changed his mind three years later when Thompson's testimony took place. <br />
<br />
[[File:CallBullockvGoodall1854v3p44.jpg |link=Media:CallsReports1854V3BullockvGoodall.pdf |thumb|left|300px|First page of the opinion [[Media:CallsReports1854V3BullockvGoodall.pdf |''Bullock v. Goodall'']], in ''Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals'', by Daniel Call. 3rd ed. Richmond: A. Morris, 1854.]]<br />
<br />
The Chancery Court shot down Bullock the younger's argument that it was usurping legal courts' appellate authority. Chapter 9 of the 1787 Virginia statutes prohibited the Chancery Court from refusing to hear a case due to lack of jurisdiction, or to delay or refuse justice. The Chancery Court noted that when Clough returned the execution in June 1795, he placed all the parties in their proper state, which means there would have been no basis for fining Clough. Since the return happened after the county court issued its judgment, though, there was no way for the county court to alter its opinion to put the parties in their proper state. The Chancery Court concluded that this situation was therefore a fine case for equitable relief.<br />
<br />
The Court also noted that, as Bullock the younger admitted, Bullock the elder had no more property to seize to satisfy the rest of the award. Returning the execution and proceeding further in court would likely lead to prison for Bullock the elder, which Bullock the younger said he did not want. Because Bullock the younger had nothing to gain by Clough returning the execution, Bullock the younger could not have been injured by Clough's actions. <br />
<br />
The Chancery Court said that fining Goodall would lead to the perverse result of Bullock the younger being in a better position by Clough not returning the execution than by Clough returning it. Moreover, because Thompson's indicated that Bullock the younger told Clough there was no hurry in returning the execution, then sued Clough for not promptly returning it, the Chancery Court found that Bullock the younger was "guilty of a foul fraud. . .venial in the eyes of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Coke Edward Coke]". <br />
<br />
The Chancery Court also said that the county court seemed to be unaware of Bullock the younger's fraud. Even so, the Chancery Court noted that the county court did not make much use of its statutory discretion and hit Goodall with almost the maximum possible fine. The Chancery Court goes into the etymological origins of the word "discretion" to emphasize that even if the county court felt a fine proper, it should have adjusted the fine to fit the harm.<br />
<br />
The Court proceeds to review the principles underlying the court of equity's powers to justify its action in this case, even when involving a penalty authorized by statute. The Court calls on humanity's instinct for sympathy and cites the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Rule Golden Rule] along with a quote from the play [[Publii Terentii Afri Comoediae Sex|Heauton Timorumenos]]: ''"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto."'' ("I am a human being, I consider nothing that is human alien to me.")<ref>Terence, ''Heauton Timorumenos'' 1.1.25.</ref><br />
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The Court's opinion by Wythe proceeds with several hypotheticals involving [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gnaeus_Julius_Agricola Agricola] selling corn to Mercator to show how one person could technically breach a contract and be subject to a severe penalty, even though that breach might have put the other party in a better position than if the contract had been fulfilled.<ref>These hypotheticals include an interesting footnote (presumably from Wythe) that indicates that the phrase "a penny saved is a penny earned" goes back quite earlier than [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin Poor Richard]; it is a translation of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero Cicero's] phrase ''magnum vectigal fit parsimonia'' from his Sixth Paradox.</ref> In such situations, courts of law would traditionally require Agricola to pay Mercator to pay the full penalty for breaching the contract -- even if the breach put Mercator in a better position -- because that was what the law dictated. The Court uses a quote from [[Titi Livii Historiarum Quod Extat|Livy's Histories]] to describe the traditional law: ''leges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse. . .nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere'' ("the law was a deaf inexorable being. . .admitted of no relaxation or indulgence.")<ref>Livy, ''Titi Livii Historiarum Quod Extat'', (Amstelodami: Apud D. Elzevirium, 1678), lib. II, cap. 3. Wythe seems to be guilty of cherry-picking a quote here. He omitted the middle of Levi's phrase, which reads in full, "leges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse, salubriorem melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere, si modum excesseris" ("the law was a deaf inexorable being, better and more beneficial for the disadvantaged than the powerful, admitted of no relaxation or indulgence.") Livy seemed to view the law's intrangience as a benefit, offering greater equality for the lower classes, while Wythe altered Livy's sentence to show this inexorability as a flaw.</ref> Wythe views the court of equity as an embodiment of justice such as Pallas Athena in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orestes#Aeschylus Aeschylus's rendering of the tale of Orestes], conjuring a just and fair verdict when the letter of the law might dictate otherwise. This, the Chancery Court says, is why a court of equity such as it has the power to dissolve the injunction Bullock won, whether the injunction was given by the power of a statute or of common law. <br />
<br />
==Works Cited or Referenced by Wythe==<br />
===Cicero's ''Stoic Paradoxes''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">Ciceros ''magnum vectigal fit parsimonia''...is translated, by english lexicographers, ‘a penny saved is a penny got.’</span></tt> Translation: ''Frugality makes great revenue.''<ref>Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery'', 335.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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===Livy's ''History of Rome''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''[L]eges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse, - nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere.''</span></tt> Translation: ''[L]aws are deaf things, inexorable – they do not consider relaxing or pardon.'' Wythe uses this to illustrate how the law has viewed the stringency of contracts.<ref>Ibid.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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===Terence's ''The Self-Tormentor''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''[H]omo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.''</span></tt> Translation: ''I am a human being: I consider nothing that is human alien to me.''<ref>Ibid., 334.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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===Aeschylus's ''The Eumenides''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">[T]he design of the law compelling payment of penalties for non-performance of contracts was that the delinquent parties should make ''αντιδοσισ (antidosis)'', and thereby do justice.</span></tt> Translation: ''an exchange.''<ref>Ibid., 336.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
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==See also==<br />
*[[Between Goodall and Bullock]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
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[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Wythe%27s_Judicial_Career&diff=63188Wythe's Judicial Career2018-02-22T20:52:07Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>[[File:Postcard10_Detail.jpg|thumb|right|300px|<p>Detail from first day cover postcard for June 20, 1985, with cachet of [[George Wythe]].]]<br />
Despite being one of the more obscure Founding Fathers, [[George Wythe]] played an important role in the early history of the United States. [http://www.wm.edu William & Mary's] -- and the United States' -- [[Wythe the Teacher|first law professor]], he was a man of great integrity who greatly influenced some of the fledgling country's most important figures with jurisprudential ideas that were often ahead of their time. Why do Americans not know more about this teacher, judge, delegate to the Second Continental Congress, and signer of the [[Declaration of Independence]]? One reason may be a lack of documentation. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''[[George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge]]'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 5-6.</ref> The notes Wythe made as William & Mary's [[Professor of Law and Police]] scattered to places unknown long ago.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref><br />
<br />
In 1778, Wythe was appointed to the newly created High Court of Chancery.<ref>Beverly Tucker describes the choice of Wythe as a judge: <blockquote>... the people were not wholly insensible of the want of a Court of somewhat different character; and to supply that want was one of the objects, to which the framers of the new Constitution directed their attention. To do this, they established three Courts, for which sixteen Judges learned in the law were wanting. The difficulty was to find the men fit to fill these important posts. ''Integrity'' and ''talent'' were abundant, but a ''learned'' lawyer was indeed a ''rara avis.'' What motive had the lawyers had to acquire learning? With the exception of some few who had studied the profession abroad, and had not been long enough in Virginia to lose the memory of what they knew, in the loose practice prevailing here, there was but one man in the State who had any claims to the character. I speak of the venerable Chancellor Wythe, a man who differed from his contemporaries in this, because in his ordinary motives and modes of action he differed altogether from other men. Without ambition, without avarice, taking no pleasure in society, he was by nature and habit addicted to solitude, and his active mind found its only enjoyment in profound research. The languages of antiquity, the exact sciences, and the law, were the three studies which alone could be pursued with a reasonable hope of arriving at that certainty which his upright and truth-loving mind contemplated as the only object worthy of his labors. To these he devoted himself, and he became a profound lawyer for the same reason that he was a profound Greek scholar, astronomer and mathematician.Beverly Tucker, ''The Principles of Pleading,'' (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1846), 56.</blockquote></ref> As a member of the Chancery Court, Wythe also heard appellate cases. An Act of the Assembly in 1779 required all three of the initial Chancery Court judges to serve ''ex officio'' on the Court of Appeals with judges from the Court of Admiralty and the General Court.<ref>Thomas Alonzo Dill, ''George Wythe: Teacher of Liberty'' (Williamsburg, Va.: Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1979), 40.</ref> When the Assembly reorganized the courts in 1788 and created a permanent Court of Appeals, Wythe remained as the sole chancellor with his decisions subject to review by the Court of Appeals.<ref>William Brockenbrough, [https://books.google.com/books?id=oTETAAAAYAAJ&pg=PR13 ''Virginia Cases: Or, Decisions of the General Court of Virginia,''] Vol. 2 (Richmond, VA: Peter Cottom, 1826), xiii.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's career as a judge may be the best-documented aspect of his life. We have multiple sources for Wythe's decisions, including decisions published by Wythe himself and decisions published in the ''Virginia Reports''. The latter include landmark Court of Appeals cases such as ''Commonwealth v. Caton''.<br />
<br />
==Cases published by Wythe==<br />
Wythe compiled a volume of some of his Chancery Court cases, now known as ''[[Wythe's Reports]]''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added decisions Wythe published separately.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
The ''Reports'' contain cases that Wythe heard as Virginia's High Chancellor, the judge who sat on the commonwealth's High Court of Chancery, a court of equity. In the Anglo-American legal system, equity developed as an alternative set of remedies to the common law system; equity was supposed to provide a solution when the common law outcome would not provide proper justice. In the early days of the United States, many states had separate courts to hear equity cases. Equity cases usually involved property, contract, and inheritance disputes, so those are the cases the reader will find in ''Wythe's Reports''. Wythepedia has created pages for each of the decisions in the ''Reports'' summarizing the case and its background and explaining references to sources Wythe cited. We can think of ''Wythe's Reports'' as his version of a casebook, the textbooks that modern law students are familiar with. Wythe excerpts and summarizes the court's decisions, sometimes including subsequent appeals to other courts, then comments on them. Wythe hopes that by reading his commentaries on the courts' decisions, future lawyers and students of law will reach a better understanding of the law as it was in Virginia and how he thought it ''should'' be. <br />
<br />
Wythe's ''Reports'' demands a lot from its readers. Wythe frequently cited or alluded to Ancient Greek and Latin works (often in their original language, with no English translation), as well as more recent classic authors such as Cervantes, Dante, and Shakespeare. He frequently used shorthand references and terms of art that lawyers of his era would understand, but which may baffle 21st-century readers. Wythe frequently left out information such as how the case arrived before him or facts that Wythe found irrelevant to the point he was trying to make. Often, if a Wythe decision was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that higher court's opinion would be a better source for the facts of the case. <br />
<br />
Properly understanding Wythe's decisions also means knowing their historical context. Many of the cases Wythe decided were influenced by events that were familiar to educated people in his day, but are esoteric history to modern Americans. Wythe also believed that Roman law principles were sometimes superior to English legal precedent, and cautioned against blindly following England's caselaw. Wythe believed, as did many of his contemporaries, that as a new country, the United States might wish to follow European-style civil law principles rather than Anglo common law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref><br />
<br />
Another important piece of subtext lurking within ''Wythe's Reports'' is its author's long rivalry with [[Edmund Pendleton]], President of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Wythe had arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, and he was rarely defeated when he argued a case. The gregarious Pendleton, however, was a master litigator and one of the few people capable of defeating Wythe in court. As President of the Supreme Court, Pendleton reversed a substantial number of Wythe's decisions.<br />
<br />
Wythepedia articles on the cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' summarize the case, and include notes and links to useful articles that can better explain the conflict and reasoning in the case. Wythepedia also includes articles that fill in the background behind a number of these decisions. ''Wythe's Reports'' can be a treatise on Virginia law and equity, a snapshot of life in Virginia during the late 18th century, and a profile of one of this nation's most underappreciated Founders. <br />
<br />
<div style="column-count:3;-moz-column-count:3;-webkit-column-count:3"><br />
*''[[Ambler v. Wyld]]''<br />
*''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]''<br />
*''[[Bailey v. Teackle]]''<br />
*''[[Beverley v. Rennolds]]''<br />
*''[[Burnsides v. Reid]]''<br />
*''[[Cadwallader v. Mason]]''<br />
*''[[Cary v. Buxton]]''<br />
*''[[Case upon the Statute for Distribution]]''<br />
*''[[Cobs v. Mosby]]''<br />
*''[[Cochran v. Street]]''<br />
*''[[Cole v. Scott]]''<br />
*''[[Dandridge v. Lyon]]''<br />
*''[[Dawson v. Winslow]]''<br />
*''[[Devisme v. Martin]]''<br />
*''[[Farley v. Shippen]]''<br />
*''[[Farrar v. Jackson]]''<br />
*''[[Field v. Harrison]]''<br />
*''[[Fowler v. Saunders]]''<br />
*''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]''<br />
*''[[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]]''<br />
*''[[Harrison v. Allen]]''<br />
*''[[Hearne v. Roane]]''<br />
*''[[Hill v. Gregory]]''<br />
*''[[Hinde v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Hooe v. Kelsick]]''<br />
*''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]''<br />
*''[[Hudgins v. Wrights]]''<br />
*''[[Hylton v. Hunter]]''<br />
*''[[Jones v. White]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Braxton]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Donelson]]''<br />
*''[[Maze v. Hamilton]]''<br />
*''[[Nance v. Woodward]]''<br />
*''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]''<br />
*''[[Overton v. Ross]]''<br />
*''[[Page v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Hoomes]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Lomax]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Whiting]]''<br />
*''[[Roane v. Innis]]''<br />
*''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]''<br />
*''[[Ross v. Pines]]''<br />
*''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]''<br />
*''[[Shermer v. Richardson]]''<br />
*''[[Southall v. M'Keand]]''<br />
*''[[Turpin v. Turpin]]''<br />
*''[[Wilkins v. Taylor]]''<br />
*''[[Williams v. Jacob]]''<br />
*''[[Wilson v. Rucker]]''<br />
*''[[Woodson v. Woodson]]''<br />
*''[[Woods v. Macrae]]''<br />
*''[[Yates v. Salle]]''<br />
</div><br />
<br />
==Cases from Virginia Reports==<br />
<div style="column-count:3;-moz-column-count:3;-webkit-column-count:3"><br />
*''[[Alexander v. Morris]]''<br />
*''[[Allen v. Harrison]]''<br />
*''[[Allen v. Minor]]''<br />
*''[[Anderson v. Anderson]]''<br />
*''[[Anderson v. Fox]]''<br />
*''[[Anderson v. Gest]]''<br />
*''[[Applebury v. Anthony]]''<br />
*''[[Austin's Admin v. Winston's Executrix]]''<br />
*''[[Baird v. Bland]]''<br />
*''[[Barnett & Co. v. Smith & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Barrett v. Floyd]]''<br />
*''[[Beckwith v. Butler]]''<br />
*''[[Bedford v. Hickman]]''<br />
*''[[Bernard v. Hipkins]]''<br />
*''[[Blane v. Proudfit]]''<br />
*''[[Blane v. Smith]]''<br />
*''[[Blanton v. Brackett]]''<br />
*''[[Blunt v. Gee]]''<br />
*''[[Branch v. Burnley]]''<br />
*''[[Braxton v. Andrews]]''<br />
*''[[Braxton v. Gaines]]''<br />
*''[[Braxton v. Lee's heirs]]''<br />
*''[[Braxton v. Morris]]''<br />
*''[[Brewer v. Hastie & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Brown v. Brown]]''<br />
*''[[Browne v. Turberville]]''<br />
*''[[Buckner v. Smith]]''<br />
*''[[Burnsides v. Reid]]''<br />
*''[[Bullock v. Goodall]]''<br />
*''[[Campbell v. Price]]''<br />
*''[[Carter's Ex'or v. Currie]]''<br />
*''[[Cary v. Macon]]''<br />
*''[[Chandler's Executrix v. Hill]]''<br />
*''[[Chapman's Adm'x v. Turner]]''<br />
*''[[Chapmans v. Chapman]]''<br />
*''[[Cheshire v. Atkinson]]''<br />
*''[[Chichester's Executrix v. Vass's Admn.]]''<br />
*''[[Chisholm v. Starke]]''<br />
*''[[Claiborne v. Henderson]]''<br />
*''[[Clarke v. Conn]]''<br />
*''[[Clay v. Williams]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Beaumarchais]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Bristow]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Caton]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Colquhouns]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Ronald]]''<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Walker's Exc'r]]''<br />
*''[[Countz v. Geiger]]''<br />
*''[[Coutt's Trustees v. Craig]]''<br />
*''[[Coutts v. Greenhow]]''<br />
*''[[Cowles v. Brown]]''<br />
*''[[Cringan v. Nicolson's Exec'rs]]''<br />
*''[[Croughton v. Duval]]''<br />
*''[[Curry v. Burns]]''<br />
*''[[Dabney v. Green]]''<br />
*''[[Dalby v. Price]]''<br />
*''[[Dandridge v. Dorrington]]''<br />
*''[[Dandridge v. Harris]]''<br />
*''[[Dangerfield v. Rootes]]''<br />
*''[[Davenport v. Mason]]''<br />
*''[[Deanes v. Scriba]]''<br />
*''[[Deneale v. Morgan's Ex'ors]]''<br />
*''[[Dunn v. Bray]]''<br />
*''[[Duval v. Bibb]]''<br />
*''[[Ellzey v. Lane's Executrix]]''<br />
*''[[Engle v. Burns]]''<br />
*''[[Eppes v. Randolph]]''<br />
*''[[Eppes v. Tucker]]''<br />
*''[[Fitzgerald v. Jones]]''<br />
*''[[Fitzhugh v. Anderson]]''<br />
*''[[Fitzhugh v. Foote]]''<br />
*''[[Fleming v. Bolling]]''<br />
*''[[Flemings v. Willis]]''<br />
*''[[Fletcher v. Pollard]]''<br />
*''[[Ford v. Gardner]]''<br />
*''[[Foster v. Crenshaw's Exec'ors]]''<br />
*''[[Fowler v. Saunders]]''<br />
*''[[Franklin v. Wilkinson]]''<br />
*''[[Freelands v. Royall]]''<br />
*''[[Goodwin v. Miller]]''<br />
*''[[Graham v. Woodson]]''<br />
*''[[Granberry v. Granberry]]''<br />
*''[[Grantland v. Wight]]''<br />
*''[[Green v. Price]]''<br />
*''[[Hackett v. Alcock]]''<br />
*''[[Hadfield v. Jameson]]''<br />
*''[[Harrison v. Field]]''<br />
*''[[Harrison v. Harrison]]''<br />
*''[[Harvey v. Borden]]''<br />
*''[[Hawkins's Ex'ors v. Minor, Ex'or of Berkeley]]''<br />
*''[[Henderson v. Hudson]]''<br />
*''[[Henderson v. Lightfoot]]''<br />
*''[[Hite's Exec. v. Paul's heirs]]''<br />
*''[[Hooe v. Marquess]]''<br />
*''[[Hook v. Ross]]''<br />
*''[[Hoomes v. Smock]]''<br />
*''[[Hopkins v. Blane]]''<br />
*''[[Hord v. Dishman]]''<br />
*''[[Hudgins v. Wrights]]''<br />
*''[[Hunter v. Hall]]''<br />
*''[[Johnson v. Brown]]''<br />
*''[[Johnson v. Buffington]]''<br />
*''[[Johnson v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Jones v. Roberts]]''<br />
*''[[Jones v. Tomlinson]]''<br />
*''[[Jones v. Williams]]''<br />
*''[[Latham v. Latham]]''<br />
*''[[Lawrason v. Davenport]]''<br />
*''[[Lee v. Braxton]]''<br />
*''[[Lewis's Ex'or v. Bacon]]''<br />
*''[[Linsay v. Howerton]]''<br />
*''[[Lipscomb's Adm. v. Winston]]''<br />
*''[[Lomax v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Long v. Colston]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Braxton]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Ross, Shore & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Madison v. Vaughan]]''<br />
*''[[Maupin v. Whiting]]''<br />
*''[[Mayo v. Bentley]]''<br />
*''[[M'Call v. Peachy]]''<br />
*''[[M'Connico v. Curzen]]''<br />
*''[[Meredith v. Johns]]''<br />
*''[[Mills v. Bell]]''<br />
*''[[Minnis v. Aylett]]''<br />
*''[[M'Kim v. Fulton]]''<br />
*''[[Moore's Executor v. Aylett's Executor]]''<br />
*''[[Moring v. Lucas]]''<br />
*''[[Morris v. Owen]]''<br />
*''[[Morris v. Ross]]''<br />
*''[[M'Rae v. Woods (1795)]]''<br />
*''[[M'Rae v. Woods (1807)]]''<br />
*''[[Mutual Assurance Co. v. Mahon]]''<br />
*''[[Nelson v. Harwood]]''<br />
*''[[Nelson v. Suddarth]]''<br />
*''[[Nice v. Purcell]]''<br />
*''[[Nicholas's Executors v. Tyler]]''<br />
*''[[Norton v. Rose]]''<br />
*''[[Page's Exec. v. Winston's Adm'r]]''<br />
*''[[Payne v. Dudley]]''<br />
*''[[Paynes v. Coles]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton's Exc'r v. Stewart]]''<br />
*''[[Perkins v. Saunders]]''<br />
*''[[Picket v. Dowdall]]''<br />
*''[[Picket v. Morris]]''<br />
*''[[Pleasants v. Pleasants]]''<br />
*''[[Pollard v. Cartwright]]''<br />
*''[[Pollard v. Patterson's Adm.]]''<br />
*''[[Pope v. Towles]]''<br />
*''[[Price v. Campbell (1799)]]''<br />
*''[[Price v. Campbell (1804)]]''<br />
*''[[Price v. Crump]]''<br />
*''[[Price v. Strange]]''<br />
*''[[Pryor v. Adams]]''<br />
*''[[Quarrier v. Carter's Rep.]]''<br />
*''[[Quesnel v. Woodlief]]''<br />
*''[[Randolph v. Randolph]]''<br />
*''[[Randolph's Exc'r v. Randolph's Exc'rs]]''<br />
*''[[Richardson v. Baker]]''<br />
*''[[Richardson's Exec v. Hunt]]''<br />
*''[[Robert's Widow v. Stanton]]''<br />
*''[[Robertson v. Campbell]]''<br />
*''[[Rose v. Murchie]]''<br />
*''[[Ross v. Colville & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Rowton v. Rowton]]''<br />
*''[[Sallee v. Yates]]''<br />
*''[[Scott's Ex'ors v. Osborne's Exec'r]]''<br />
*''[[Scott's Ex'ors v. Trents]]''<br />
*''[[Shermer v. Shermer]]''<br />
*''[[Skipwith v. Clinch (1800)]]''<br />
*''[[Skipwith v. Clinch (1801)]]''<br />
*''[[Smallwood v. Mercer]]''<br />
*''[[Smith v. Chapman]]''<br />
*''[[Smith v. Wallace]]''<br />
*''[[Southall v. M'Keand]]''<br />
*''[[Spotswood v. Dandridge]]''<br />
*''[[Spotswood v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Spottswood v. Dandridge]]''<br />
*''[[Stanard v. Brownlow]]''<br />
*''[[Stannard v. Graves]]''<br />
*''[[Stephens v. Cobun]]''<br />
*''[[Stockton v. Cook]]''<br />
*''[[Syme v. Johnston]]''<br />
*''[[Tabb v. Archer]]''<br />
*''[[Taliaferro v. Minor]]''<br />
*''[[Taliaferro v. Minor]]''<br />
*''[[Taliaferro's Ex'ors v. Thornton]]''<br />
*''[[Tarpley v. Dobyns]]''<br />
*''[[Taylor v. Stone]]''<br />
*''[[Taylor's Admin. v. Nicholson]]''<br />
*''[[Templeman v. Steptoe]]''<br />
*''[[The Auditor of Public Accounts v. Nicholas]]''<br />
*''[[The Auditor v. Chevallie]]''<br />
*''[[The Auditor v. Johnson's Exec'x]]''<br />
*''[[The President and Professors and Masters of William & Mary College v. Hodgson]]''<br />
*''[[Thornton v. Corbin]]''<br />
*''[[Tinsley v. Anderson]]''<br />
*''[[Tomlinson v. Dillard]]''<br />
*''[[Tomlinson v. Dillard/Mackey v. Bell]]''<br />
*''[[Towler v. Buchanans, Hastie & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Triplett v. Wilson]]''<br />
*''[[Turpin v. Locket]]''<br />
*''[[Turnpin v. Thomas]]''<br />
*''[[Upshaw v. Upshaw]]''<br />
*''[[Walcott v. Swan]]''<br />
*''[[Walker v. Walke]]''<br />
*''[[Wallace v. Taliaferro]]''<br />
*''[[Ward v. Webber]]''<br />
*''[[Westfall v. Singleton]]''<br />
*''[[White v. Atkinson (1795)]]''<br />
*''[[White v. Atkinson (1800)]]''<br />
*''[[Wigglesworth v. Steers]]''<br />
*''[[Wilkins v. Taylor]]''<br />
*''[[Wilson v. Keeling]]''<br />
*''[[Winston v. Johnson's Exec.]]''<br />
*''[[Wolcott v. Swan]]''<br />
*''[[Woodson v. Barrett & Co.]]''<br />
*''[[Woodson v. Payne]]''<br />
*''[[Worsham v. M'Kenzie]]''<br />
*''[[Wright v. Dawney]]''<br />
*''[[Yancey v. Hopkins]]''<br />
*''[[Yates v. Murdoch]]''<br />
*''[[Yerby v. Yerby]]''<br />
*''[[Young v. Price]]''<br />
*''[[Young v. Skipwith]]''<br />
</div><br />
<br />
==County court cases==<br />
<br />
*''[[Warrington v. Jiggitts]]''<br />
<br />
==Court of Appeals cases==<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Caton]]''<br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery]]''<br />
*[[George Wythe and Slavery]]<br />
*[[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]]<br />
*[[Teacher of Jefferson and Marshall|The Teacher of Jefferson and Marshall]]<br />
*[[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]]<br />
*[[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references /><br />
<br />
==Further reading==<br />
*Bryson, W. Hamilton. "The Use of Roman Law in Virginia Courts." In ''American Journal of Legal History'' 28 (1984): 135-146.<br />
*Hoffman, Richard J. "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800." In ''American Journal of Legal History'' 55 (1978): 55-84.<br />
*Holt, Wythe. "[http://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2058/Issue%205/Holt.pdf George Wythe: Early Modern Judge.]" In ''Alabama Law Review'' 58, no. 5 (2007): 1009-1039.<br />
<br />
==External links==<br />
*[https://scvahistory.org/about/w/george-wythe-1779-1789/ George Wythe, August 30, 1779-March 5, 1789,] Virginia Appellate Court History.<br />
<br />
[[Category:Aspects of Wythe's Life]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Seal_of_the_High_Court_of_Chancery&diff=56722Seal of the High Court of Chancery2017-06-13T18:50:53Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>__NOTOC__<br />
[[File:VirginiaHighCourtOfChancerySeal.jpg|thumb|right|600px|Impression in paper of the Seal of the High Court of Chancery of the State Virginia. Original at the [http://lib.law.virginia.edu/specialcollections/records/mss/88-5/digital/2535 Arthur J. Morris Law Library Special Collections,] University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.]]<br />
In January, 1791, [[George Wythe]] [[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 10 January 1791|wrote to Thomas Jefferson]] in Philadelphia to ask his opinion about the design of a seal for the High Court of Chancery of the State of Virginia.<ref>[[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 10 January 1791]]. ''The Thomas Jefferson Papers,'' Library of Congress.</ref> Wythe enclosed a design by [[wikipedia:Benjamin West|Benjamin West]], who had previously assisted in designing the [[Seal of the Commonwealth of Virginia|Great Seal of Virginia]], in 1776. Wythe mentions the front of the design picturing the skin of [[wikipedia:Sisamnes|Sisamnes]], and the reverse representing "Patomoack, &amp;c" (the Potomac River), with the words "state of Virginia." The story of Sisamnes, an unjust judge who was skinned alive for delivering an unjust verdict, is related in Herodotus' [[Herodotus Histories|''Histories'']].<br />
<br />
Jefferson wrote back in July of 1792, to say that an engraver in Philadelphia, James Poupard,<ref>David McNeely Stauffer, [https://books.google.com/books?id=s1k6AQAAMAAJ&pg=PA214 "Poupard, James,"] in ''American Engravers Upon Copper and Steel,'' Vol. 1 (New York: Grolier Club, 1907), </ref> could make the two-sided seal in brass for $64.00, or in steel for $128.00.<ref>[[Thomas Jefferson to Wythe, 12 July 1792]]. ''The Thomas Jefferson Papers,'' Library of Congress.</ref> On November 3, 1792, The Virginia assembly approved a payment of £20 to Wythe to help him buy the seal.<ref>''Chap. XXXIII of November 3, 1792'', WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619 542 (1823).</ref> A seal as described was made, since at least one impression of it exists,<ref>[http://lib.law.virginia.edu/specialcollections/records/mss/88-5/digital/2535 Seals for the State of Virginia and the High Court of Chancery,] University of Virginia Law Library, University of Virginia.</ref> and a seal matching the description was donated to the [http://hsp.org/ Historical Society of Pennsylvania] in 1874, an impression of which was described by Benson J. Lossing in the ''American Historical Record'' (see [[#American Historical Record, August 1874|below]]).<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=9HQtAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA375 "An Old Seal,"] ''American Historical Record'' 3, no. 32 (August 1874), 375.</ref><ref>John Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, [https://books.google.com/books?id=BHkCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1055 ''History of Pennsylvania, 1609-1884,''] Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: L.H. Everts, 1884), 1055:<br />
<blockquote style="font-size: 85%"><br />
J. Poupard also engraved, for the ''Pennsylvania Magazine,'' a head of Dr. Goldsmith. He engraved several plates for the second volume of the "Transactions of the American Philosophical Society," and a curious seal for a burlesque "High Court of Chancery," which is in possession of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.<br />
</blockquote><br />
</ref><br />
<br />
The classical design and motifs of the seal&mdash;especially the front of the seal&mdash;are indicative of Wythe's influence. Wythe's ideas were incorporated into the designing of the [[Seal of the Commonwealth of Virginia]], and the second [[Seal of the College|Seal of the College of William & Mary]].<br />
<br />
==Description of the seal==<br />
<br />
The seal would have been a coin-like two-sided metal disc or "matrix" made in brass or steel, approximately two inches in diameter. According to the query in the ''American Historcial Review'' ([[#American Historical Record, August 1874|below]]), it was stamped with the mark of the engraver, "James Poupard, Philadelphia". Since this mark is not observed in impressions, it must have been along the outside edge of the seal.<br />
<br />
The front, or obverse, of the seal is inscribed around the perimeter: HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY MDCCXC (1790). In the center is a judge seated at the entrance to&mdash;or inside&mdash;a temple; in his left hand is a scroll or proclamation; under his right hand is draped a flayed human skin. This is [[wikipedia:Otanes|Otanes]], son of Sisamnes, forced to sit in judgment on the punished remains of his corrupt father. Over the entrance to the temple is written in Greek, ΚΡΙΝ' ΕΥΘΕΙΑΝ ΔΙΚΗΝ: "Let thy justice be direct," spoken by the Erinyes (Furies) in the [[Aeschylus Tragedies|''Eumenides'' of Aeschylus]]<ref>A.W. Verrall, trans., [https://books.google.com/books?id=wp45tOLcwY4C&pg=PA76 ''The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus,''] (London: MacMillan, 1908), 76-77.</ref> To the right of the judge is a female figure, naked but for being surrounded by clouds, with light emanating from her head. She points to the inscription above the judge's head. On the left is a helmeted figure bearing the Roman fasces and a mirror.<br />
<br />
The reverse of the seal is inscribed STATE OF VIRGINIA on the perimeter, surrounding two female figures: an image of a robed Justice in the sky, seated on clouds, bearing a sword upright on her right shoulder, and a set of scales in her left; and a Native American figure, supported by the four principal rivers of Virginia, inscribed JAMES, YORK, RAPAHANAC (?), and PATOMOAC (?), which empty into the bay of CHESAPEAK, holding a lance or oar in her right hand, and bearing tobacco leaves in her left.<br />
<br />
==American Historical Record, August 1874==<br />
===Page 375===<br />
<br />
<center><br />
''NOTES AND QUERIES.''<br />
</center><br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
An OLD SEAL.&mdash;The seal from which the enclosed is an impression was purchased some time since by a metal merchant. It bears the stamp of "James Poupard, Philadelphia," who is registered as an engraver in the Directory of 1793. Can you give any information regarding it? It is about to be presented to the Historical Society of this State.<sup>1</sup><br />
<div align="right"><br />
C. Harrod Vinton.<br />
</div><br />
''Philadelphia, May,'' 1784.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<div style="font-size: 85%"><br />
<sup>1</sup> The impression shows the seal to be much worn. The devices, &amp;c., seem to be these: In the centre of the seal sits the figure of a grave man draped in robes, sitting at the portal of a temple, over which is an illegible inscription in Greek. This figure holds a naked short sword in his right hand, and evidently represents ''Justice.'' On one side of him stands, partly enveloped in clouds, and evidently representing ''Truth,'' the figure of a naked woman pointing to the inscription over the portal. On the other side is the figure of a partly-draped man, with a helmet on his head, and holding in his right hand a mirror which reflects ''Truth,'' and in the other hand the fasces and axe, symbols of the ''Executor of Justice.'' Around the edge of the seal is the legend: "HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY. MDCCXC." Is it not a former seal of the High Court of Chancery of Pennsylvania?<br />
<br />
Dunlap says there was an "M. Poupard, an engraver in Philadelphia, about 1790." May this not have been M. or Mr. James Poupard, above referred to? M. Poupard had been a player in a theatre in Martinique, and when he came to the United States, he turned his hand to engraving. Lawson, the celebrated engraver of birds in "Wilson's Ornithology," says Poupard married a woman of some property, who was a "fanatical Methodist," and that her husband, when with her, was "as far gone as herself; when away from her he was a very merry fellow, and amused his companions by reciting and acting."&mdash;[ED.]<br />
</div><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
<br />
*[[Hai tou Aischylou Trageodiai Seozomenai Hepta]]<br />
*[[Hērodotou Halikarnasseōs Historia]]<br />
*[[Hērodotou Halikarnēssēos Historiōn Logoi 9 Epigraphomenoi Mousai]]<br />
*[[Seal of the College]]<br />
*[[Seal of the Commonwealth of Virginia]]<br />
*[[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 10 January 1791]]<br />
*[[Thomas Jefferson to Wythe, 14 March 1791]]<br />
*[[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 15 June 1792]]<br />
*[[Thomas Jefferson to Wythe, 12 July 1792]]<br />
*[[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 24 July 1792]]<br />
*[[Wythe to Thomas Jefferson, 15 August 1792]]<br />
*[[Thomas Jefferson to Wythe, 11 September 1792]]<br />
*[[Thomas Jefferson to Wythe, 17 March 1793]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category: Seals]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=56462User:Fwding/Sandbox2017-05-26T20:31:53Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
<br />
Some of the United States' Founders are better-known than others. Washington and Jefferson are always present in the popular mind. Before Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical, asking the average modern American about Alexander Hamilton would likely get a mumbled reply about the ten-dollar bill. One of the more obscure Founders is George Wythe. Today, if anyone encounters Wythe, it is usually as a supporting character in other Founders' stories: mentor, teacher, and friend to Jefferson; or committee chair calling for Virginia to ratify the U.S. Constitution.<br />
<br />
But Wythe played an important role in the United States's early days. William & Mary's -- and the United States' -- first law professor, he was a man of great integrity who greatly influenced some of the fledgling country's most important figures with jurisprudential ideas that were often ahead of their time. Why do Americans not know more about this teacher, judge, delegate to the Second Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence? One reason may be a lack of documentation. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> The notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police scattered to places unknown long ago.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref><br />
<br />
We do, however, have the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe intended to be published.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
The ''Reports'' contain cases that Wythe heard as Virginia's High Chancellor, the judge who sat on the commonwealth's High Court of Chancery, a court of equity. In the Anglo-American legal system, equity developed as an alternative set of remedies to the common law system; equity was supposed to provide a soultion when the common law outcome would not provide proper justice. In the early days of the United States, many states had separate courts to hear equity cases. Equity cases usually involved property, contract, and inheritance disputes, so those are the cases the reader will find in ''Wythe's Reports''. Wythepedia has created pages for each of the decisions in the ''Reports'' summarizing the case and its background and explaining references to sources Wythe cited. We can think of ''Wythe's Reports'' as his version of a casebook, the textbooks that modern law students are familiar with. Wythe excerpts and summarizes the court's decisions, sometimes including subsequent appeals to other courts, then comments on them. Wythe hopes that by reading his commentaries on the courts' decisions, future lawyers and students of law will reach a better understanding of the law as it was in Virginia and how he thought it ''should'' be. <br />
<br />
Wythe's ''Reports'' demands a lot from its readers. Wythe frequently cited or alluded to Ancient Greek and Latin works (often in their original language, with no English translation), as well as more recent classic authors such as Cervantes, Dante, and Shakespeare. He frequently used shorthand references and terms of art that lawyers of his era would understand, but which 21st-century readers may find baffling. Wythe frequently left out information such as how the case arrived before him or facts that Wythe found irrelevant to the point he was trying to make. Often, if a Wythe decision was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that higher court's opinion would be a better source for the facts of the case. <br />
<br />
Properly understanding Wythe's decisions also means knowing their historical context. Many of the cases Wythe decided were influenced by events that were familiar to educated people in his day, but are esoteric history to modern Americans. Wythe also believed that Roman law principles were sometimes superior to English legal precedent, and cautioned against blindly following England's caselaw. Wythe believed, as did many of his contemporaries, that as a new country, the United States might wish to follow European-style civil law principles rather than Anglo common law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref><br />
<br />
Another important piece of subtext lurking within ''Wythe's Reports'' is its author's long rivalry with [[Edmund Pendleton]], President of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Wythe had arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, and he was rarely defeated when he argued a case. The gregarious Pendleton, however, was a master litigator and one of the few people capable of defeating Wythe in court. As President of the Supreme Court, Pendleton reversed a substantial number of Wythe's decisions.<br />
<br />
Wythepedia articles on the cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' summarize the case, and include notes and links to useful articles that can better explain the conflict and reasoning in the case. Wythepedia also includes articles that fill in the background behind a number of these decisions. ''Wythe's Reports'' can be a treatise on Virginia law and equity, a snapshot of life in Virginia during the late 18th century, and a profile of one of this nation's most underappreciated Founders. We hope you find our case summaries useful.<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=56460User:Fwding/Sandbox2017-05-26T20:31:05Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
Some of the United States' Founders are better-known than others. Washington and Jefferson are always present in the popular mind. Before Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical, asking the average modern American about Alexander Hamilton would likely get a mumbled reply about the ten-dollar bill. One of the more obscure Founders is George Wythe. Today, if anyone encounters Wythe, it is usually as a supporting character in other Founders' stories: mentor, teacher, and friend to Jefferson; or committee chair calling for Virginia to ratify the U.S. Constitution.<br />
<br />
But Wythe played an important role in the United States's early days. William & Mary's -- and the United States' -- first law professor, he was a man of great integrity who greatly influenced some of the fledgling country's most important figures with jurisprudential ideas that were often ahead of their time. Why do Americans not know more about this teacher, judge, delegate to the Second Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence? One reason may be a lack of documentation. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> The notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police scattered to places unknown long ago.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref><br />
<br />
We do, however, have the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe intended to be published.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
The ''Reports'' contain cases that Wythe heard as Virginia's High Chancellor, the judge who sat on the commonwealth's High Court of Chancery, a court of equity. In the Anglo-American legal system, equity developed as an alternative set of remedies to the common law system; equity was supposed to provide a soultion when the common law outcome would not provide proper justice. In the early days of the United States, many states had separate courts to hear equity cases. Equity cases usually involved property, contract, and inheritance disputes, so those are the cases the reader will find in ''Wythe's Reports''. Wythepedia has created pages for each of the decisions in the ''Reports'' summarizing the case and its background and explaining references to sources Wythe cited. We can think of ''Wythe's Reports'' as his version of a casebook, the textbooks that modern law students are familiar with. Wythe excerpts and summarizes the court's decisions, sometimes including subsequent appeals to other courts, then comments on them. Wythe hopes that by reading his commentaries on the courts' decisions, future lawyers and students of law will reach a better understanding of the law as it was in Virginia and how he thought it <ital>should</ital> be. <br />
<br />
Wythe's ''Reports'' demands a lot from its readers. Wythe frequently cited or alluded to Ancient Greek and Latin works (often in their original language, with no English translation), as well as more recent classic authors such as Cervantes, Dante, and Shakespeare. He frequently used shorthand references and terms of art that lawyers of his era would understand, but which 21st-century readers may find baffling. Wythe frequently left out information such as how the case arrived before him or facts that Wythe found irrelevant to the point he was trying to make. Often, if a Wythe decision was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, that higher court's opinion would be a better source for the facts of the case. <br />
<br />
Properly understanding Wythe's decisions also means knowing their historical context. Many of the cases Wythe decided were influenced by events that were familiar to educated people in his day, but are esoteric history to modern Americans. Wythe also believed that Roman law principles were sometimes superior to English legal precedent, and cautioned against blindly following England's caselaw. Wythe believed, as did many of his contemporaries, that as a new country, the United States might wish to follow European-style civil law principles rather than Anglo common law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref><br />
<br />
Another important piece of subtext lurking within ''Wythe's Reports'' is its author's long rivalry with [[Edmund Pendleton]], President of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Wythe had arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, and he was rarely defeated when he argued a case. The gregarious Pendleton, however, was a master litigator and one of the few people capable of defeating Wythe in court. As President of the Supreme Court, Pendleton reversed a substantial number of Wythe's decisions.<br />
<br />
Wythepedia articles on the cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' summarize the case, and include notes and links to useful articles that can better explain the conflict and reasoning in the case. Wythepedia also includes articles that fill in the background behind a number of these decisions. ''Wythe's Reports'' can be a treatise on Virginia law and equity, a snapshot of life in Virginia during the late 18th century, and a profile of one of this nation's most underappreciated Founders. We hope you find our case summaries useful.<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=56328User:Fwding/Sandbox2017-04-07T14:54:50Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
Some of the United States' Founders are better-known than others. Washington and Jefferson are always present in the popular mind. Before Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical, asking the average modern American about Alexander Hamilton would likely get a mumbled reply about the ten-dollar bill. One of the more obscure Founders is George Wythe, the College of William & Mary's first law professor. Today, if anyone encounters Wythe, it is usually as a supporting character in other Founders' stories: as mentor, teacher, and friend to Jefferson; or as a committee chair calling for Virginia to ratify the U.S. Constitution.<br />
<br />
Wythe, however, was much more than a bit player in the United States's early days. He was America's first law professor, a man of great integrity who greatly influenced some of the fledgling country's most important figures with jurisprudential ideas that were often ahead of their time. Why do Americans not know more about this professor (first in the United States), judge, delegate to the Second Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence? Part of the issue may be a lack of documentation. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, state printer Thomas Ritchie obtained the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and considered publishing them. Virginia Governor John Tyler, Sr., asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
<br />
We do, however, have the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
The ''Reports'' contain cases that Wythe heard as Virginia's High Chancellor, the judge who sat on the commonwealth's High Court of Chancery. The High Court of Chancery was a court of equity. In the Anglo-American legal system, equity developed as an alternative set of remedies to the common law system; equity was supposed to provide a soultion when the common law outcome would not provide proper justice. In the early days of the United States, many states had separate courts to hear equity cases. These days, in almost all states, the same court handles equitable and legal remedies.<ref>The article [http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1378&context=flr Howard L. Oleck, "Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence", ''Fordham Law Review'' 20 (1951): 23] has a good description of the history of courts of equity in the U.S. [http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5s5119t5 Samuel L. Bray, "The System of Equitable Remedies", ''UCLA L. Rev.'' 63 (2016): 530] summarizes the state of equity in American courts today.</ref> Equity cases usually involved property, contract, and inheritance disputes, so those are the cases the reader will find in ''Wythe's Reports''. Wythepedia has created pages for each of the decisions in the ''Reports''; each page summarizes the case and its background, and explains references to sources that Wythe makes in the cases. We can think of ''Wythe's Reports'' as his version of a casebook, the textbooks that modern law students are familiar with. Just like 21st-century casebooks, Wythe excerpts and summarizes the court's decisions, sometimes including subsequent appeals to other courts, then comments on them. Wythe hopes that the reader, by reading Wythe's commentaries on the courts' decisions, will reach a better understanding of the law as it was in Virginia and how Wythe thought it should be. <br />
<br />
Wythe expected much of his students, and his ''Reports'' demands a lot from its reader. Wythe frequently cited or alluded to Ancient Greek and Latin works (often in their original language, with no English translation), as well as more recent classic authors such as Cervantes, Dante, and Shakespeare. He frequently used shorthand references and terms of art that lawyers of his era would understand, but which 21st-century readers may find baffling. Wythe frequently left out information such as how the case arrived before him or facts that Wythe found irrelevant to the point he was trying to make (often, if a Wythe decision was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, that higher court's opinion would be a better source for the facts of the case, or even what happened in Wythe's court). <br />
<br />
Properly understanding Wythe's decisions also means knowing their historical context. Many of the cases Wythe heard involved property, probate, and contract disputes, which were influenced by events that were familiar to educated people in Wythe's day but are esoteric history to modern Americans. Wythe also believed that Roman law principles were sometimes superior to English legal precedent, and cautioned against blindly following the mother country's caselaw. Wythe believed (as did numerous other lawyers around that time) that as a new country, the United States might wish to follow European-style civil law principles rather than Anglo common law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Another important piece of subtext lurking within ''Wythe's Reports'' are its author's long rivalry with [[Edmund Pendleton]], President of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Wythe had arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, and he was rarely defeated before the bench. The gregarious Pendleton, however, was a master litigator and one of the few people capable of defeating Wythe in court. As President of the Supreme Court, Pendleton reversed several of Wythe's decisions.<br />
<br />
Wythepedia articles on the cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' summarize the case, and include notes and links to useful articles that can better explain the conflict and reasoning in the case. Wythepedia also includes several articles to fill in the background behind a number of these decisions. Our article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] explains a major cause behind many of the cases Wythe heard involving real estate. Contract arguments in the post-Revolutionary era often centered around the instability of Virginia's economy before, during, and after the war; [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] explains. Several of the property and probate cases illustrated the poor legal position Virginian women found themselves in; [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] describes their situation. Wythepedia's entry on [[Edmund Pendleton]] explains his rivalry with Wythe.<br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' can be a treatise on Virginia law and equity, a snapshot of life in Virginia during the late 18th century, and a profile of one of this nation's most underappreciated Founders. Wythepedia is proud to make them available, and we hope you find our case summaries useful.<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=56324User:Fwding/Sandbox2017-04-06T21:09:20Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
Americans' fascination with the Founding Fathers seems to wax and wane as time passes. Washington and Jefferson are always present in the popular mind along with high-profile figures from other eras: Lincoln, FDR, Reagan, and so on. Many other Founders linger in relative obscurity unless a well-made work of art pulls them into the spotlight. Not that long ago, asking the average modern American about Alexander Hamilton would likely get a mumbled reply about the ten-dollar bill. After Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical, Hamilton is at the forefront of our minds. One of the more obscure Founders is George Wythe, the College of William & Mary's first law professor. Today, if anyone encounters Wythe, it is usually as a supporting character in other Founders' stories: as mentor, teacher, and friend to Jefferson; or as a committee chair calling for Virginia to ratify the U.S. Constitution. <br />
<br />
Wythe, however, was much more than a bit player in the United States's early days. As a professor, he imparted the principles of citizenship, leadership, and the law to leading figures in the fledgling United States and in the Commonwealth of Virginia. As a judge and an attorney, he presented innovative legal concepts that would help shape the course of American jurisprudence. Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutinary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study,"<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 14.</ref> and "a man widely venerated for his integrity."<ref>Lynne Cheney, ''James Madison: A Life Reconsidered'' (New York: Viking, 2014): 176.</ref> Wythe valued his integrity, even if it meant resisting popular public opinion and risking long-term antipathy from Virginia's elite class.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1017-1024.</ref> Why do Americans not know more about this professor (first in the United States), judge, delegate to the Second Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of Independence?<br />
<br />
Part of the issue may be a lack of documentation. Researchers investigating many of the other Founders have volumes upon volumes of papers at their disposal. Wythe, on the other hand, was not so generous. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, state printer Thomas Ritchie obtained the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and considered publishing them. Virginia Governor John Tyler, Sr., asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
<br />
We may not have many of Wythe's personal notes, but we do have some sources that can provide insight into his thinking and his jurisprudence. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' contain cases that Wythe heard as Virginia's High Chancellor, the judge who sat on the commonwealth's High Court of Chancery. The High Court of Chancery was a court of equity. In the Anglo-American legal system, equity developed as an alternative set of remedies to the common law system; equity was supposed to provide a soultion when the common law outcome would not provide proper justice. For example, if Person A bought a painting from Person B the day before the painter died and the painting's value tripled, the common-law remedy (probably requiring Person B to refund the purchase price) would not properly compensate Person A if Person B changed their mind and kept the painting. In this case, equity would give Person A the remedy of specific performance: Person B would have to give Person A the painting. In the early days of the United States, many states had separate courts to hear equity cases, such as Wythe's High Court of Chancery. These days, in almost all states, the same court handles equitable and legal remedies.<ref>The article [http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1378&context=flr Howard L. Oleck, "Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence", ''Fordham Law Review'' 20 (1951): 23] has a good description of the history of courts of equity in the U.S. [http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5s5119t5 Samuel L. Bray, "The System of Equitable Remedies", ''UCLA L. Rev.'' 63 (2016): 530] summarizes the state of equity in American courts today.</ref> Therefore, the cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' involve equity, not the common law. As a result, many of the cases in the ''Reports'' involve similar topics. Property and inheritance disputes compose the vast majority of the decisions. Wythepedia has created pages for each of the decisions in the ''Reports''; each page summarizes the case and its background, and explains references to sources that Wythe makes in the cases.<br />
<br />
Wythe, however, did not keep the limited scope of the contents prevent him from making his ''Reports'' a commentary on the state of jurisprudence in his country. We can think of ''Wythe's Reports'' as his version of a casebook, the textbooks that modern law students are familiar with. Just like 21st-century casebooks, Wythe excerpts and summarizes the court's decisions, sometimes including subsequent appeals to other courts, then comments on them. Wythe hopes that the reader, by reading Wythe's commentaries on the courts' decisions, will reach a better understanding of the law as it was in Virginia and how Wythe thought it should be. <br />
<br />
Wythe expected much of his students, and his ''Reports'' demands a lot from its reader. Wythepedia articles on Wythe's cases include notes and links to useful articles to help provide background and to explain Wythe's references that may be difficult for the modern reader. Wythe frequently cited or alluded to Ancient Greek and Latin works (often in their original language, with no English translation), as well as more recent classic authors such as Cervantes, Dante, and Shakespeare. Wythe had no problem with modifying those classics to suit his purpose. Such references increase in frequency in opinions where Wythe believes Virginia law will deal a great injustice to a party.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> Quotes were not always indicated; Wythe frequently expected the reader to pick up on these references. Sometimes, Wythe adjusted the original Latin quotation to better fit his style.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> At least once, in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'', Wythe extracted a Livy quote out of context to support the flip side of Livy's original argument. Wythepedia's article on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] lists resources for further research on Wythe's use of these works.<br />
<br />
The 21st-century reader of ''Wythe's Reports'' must also contend with shorthand references and terms of art that would be familiar to Wythe's legal contemporaries, but have since vanished from use. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] will puzzle over what it means to "return the execution".<ref>This referred to part of the process a sheriff (or his deputies) went through to deliver a writ issued by the court. The sheriff ''returned the execution'' when they returned the writ to the court that issued it along with notations of what actions the sheriff had taken using the writ's power.</ref> If a person wanted to refer to some of the books Wythe cited, they might need to do some detective work first. An 18th-century Virginia lawyer might know that Wythe's reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to "the book called, law of devises and revocations" meant Gilbert's ''[[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]''; most 21st-century lawyers will not.<br />
<br />
Wythe frequently omitted procedural history -- an explanation of how the case arrived in his court. He was also prone to leaving out facts that he did not believe were relevant to the point he was trying to make in discussing the case. If a Wythe decision was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, the Supreme Court's opinion would frequently present a better discussion of how the case came to the High Court of Chancery, what the facts of the case were, and sometimes even what happened in the High Court of Chancery, than Wythe's own decision.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]''.</ref> <br />
<br />
Properly understanding Wythe's decisions means knowing their historical context. Many of the cases Wythe heard involved property, probate, and contract disputes, which were influenced by events that were familiar to educated people in Wythe's day but are esoteric history to modern Americans. Wythepedia includes several articles to fill in the background behind a number of these decisions. Our article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] explains many of the cases Wythe heard involving real estate. Contract arguments in the post-Revolutionary era often centered around the instability of Virginia's economy before, during, and after the war; [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] explains. Several of the property and probate cases illustrated the poor legal position Virginian women found themselves in; [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] describes their situation.<br />
<br />
Another important piece of subtext lurking within ''Wythe's Reports'' are its author's long rivalry with [[Edmund Pendleton]], President of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Wythe had arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, and he was rarely defeated before the bench. The gregarious Pendleton, however, was a master litigator and one of the few people capable of defeating Wythe in court. As President of the Supreme Court, Pendleton reversed several of Wythe's decisions. Wythe and Pendleton worked together on some projects, but by the end of their lives, Wythe harbored deep resentment towards Pendleton. The entire ''Reports'' are, to a certain extent, a book-long polemic against the Virginia Supreme Court and its president. Wythepedia's article on [[Edmund Pendleton]] has more information on these two legal giants' rivalry.<br />
<br />
Examining Wythe's decisions and his commentaries, the reader should notice that Wythe sometimes calls upon Roman law principles (he cites the ''Corpus Juris Civilis'' twenty-one times), and that he believed Virginia courts should not be beholden to English common law precedent. During the United States' early days, while ill feelings towards England and good feelings towards France were high, there may have been a reasonable chance of European-style civil law replacing English common law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> In several decisions, Wythe warns of the dangers of blindly following English precedent.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Field v. Harrison]], [[Devisme v. Martin]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]].''</ref> In the end, though, tradition prevailed, and Virginia courts followed the English common-law mold. Frequently, when Wythe tried to create an equitable solution that avoided English precedent, Virginia's Supreme Court cited that precedent when they reversed him, undoubtedly adding to Wythe's ill will towards that court. <br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' can be a treatise on Virginia law and equity, a snapshot of life in Virginia during the late 18th century, and a profile of one of this nation's most underappreciated Founders. Wythepedia is proud to make them available, and we hope you find our case summaries useful.<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Goodall_v._Bullock&diff=56320Goodall v. Bullock2017-04-06T20:10:06Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Goodall v. Bullock''}}<br />
[[File:WytheGoodallVBullock1852.jpg|link=Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|thumb|right|400px|First page of the opinion [[Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|''Goodall v. Bullock'']], in [https://catalog.swem.wm.edu/law/Record/2099031 ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery, with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions''], by George Wythe. 2nd ed. (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1852).]]<br />
[[Media:WytheDecisions1852GoodallVBullock.pdf|''Goodall v. Bullock'']], Wythe 328 (1798),<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery (1852)|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 328.</ref> discussed whether a sheriff could be fined because his deputy did not finish executing a writ, even if the person who filed the writ is the person who asked the deputy not to finish executing it. The opinion is notable for Wythe's discussion of the principles underlying a court of equity's powers in which Wythe refers to several classical Greek and Roman sources and stories.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Parke Goodall was Sheriff of Hanover County, and John Clough was one of his deputies.<br />
<br />
John Bullock sued his father, who went by the same name, and won a judgment for about £497. Bullock the younger delivered a writ of ''fieri facias''<ref>A writ of ''fieri facias'' orders the sheriff to get goods from a person to satisfy a judgment against that person.</ref> to Clough in May 1792 to be executed against Bullock the elder's property. Clough seized Bullock the elder's entire estate under the writ and sold it to Bullock the younger in June 1792 for about £206.<br />
<br />
Clough never returned the writ to court with notations on what actions he had taken using the writ's power - a process called ''returning the execution''. Returning the execution could have led to further court proceedings against Bullock the elder. The reason for this was disputed. Clough said that in 1795 Bullock the younger asked him to delay returning the execution until the court costs were settled. To support Clough's claim, a third-party witness, William L. Thompson, said that they heard Bullock the younger say he wished Clough would not return the execution until the Bullocks settled with each other. Bullock the younger answered that he never asked Clough to delay returning the execution, but rather repeatedly asked Clough to return the execution after he had seized Bullock the elder's property.<br />
<br />
Bullock the younger sued Goodall and Clough in Hanover County Court for failure to return the execution of a writ, and on May 7, 1795, the court fined Goodall about £264 to be paid to Bullock the younger, under the authority of a 1791 Virginia statute. <br />
<br />
Clough successfully returned the execution in June 1795. Goodall successfully sued Clough to reimburse Goodall for the fine Goodall owed Bullock the younger. Goodall and Clough filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery asking it to permanently enjoin the Hanover County Court's judgment in favor of Bullock the younger, and Goodall agreed to wait to collect on his judgment against Clough until the proceedings in the Chancery Court concluded. <br />
<br />
Bullock the younger argued that because the 1791 statute gave the county court discretion in the amount of the fine to award, the Chancery Court would be improperly usurping the court of law's appellate jurisdiction by issuing an injunction. Therefore, Bullock the younger said, the Chancery Court should dismiss Goodall and Clough's case.<br />
<br />
''Goodall v. Bullock'' was reported as a [[Between Goodall and Bullock|supplemental pamphlet]] in 1798 or later,<ref>George Wythe, [[Between Goodall and Bullock|''Between William Fowler and Susanna His Wife, Plaintiffs, and, Lucy Saunders, an Infant, by James A. Patterson, Her Guardian, Defendent'' [''sic'']; ''Between Parke Goodall and John Clough, Plaintiffs, and, John Bullock, the Younger, Defendent'' [''sic'',] ]](Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1798?).</ref> printed by Thomas Nicolson of Richmond, Virginia, who had published [[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Wythe's Reports]] in 1795.<ref>Charles Evans, ''[[American Bibliography]],'' vol. 11 (1942), 122. Evans mistakenly reports the date of publication as 1796.</ref><br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
The High Court of Chancery issued permanent injunctions against Bullock the younger from collecting his judgment against Goodall, and against Goodall from collecting against Clough. The Court said that it was possible for both Thompson's and Bullock the younger's statements to be true. Bullock could have initially asked Clough to return the execution, but then changed his mind three years later when Thompson's testimony took place. <br />
<br />
The Chancery Court shot down Bullock the younger's argument that it was usurping legal courts' appellate authority. Chapter 9 of the 1787 Virginia statutes prohibited the Chancery Court from refusing to hear a case due to lack of jurisdiction, or to delay or refuse justice. The Chancery Court noted that when Clough returned the execution in June 1795, he placed all the parties in their proper state, which means there would have been no basis for fining Clough. Since the return happened after the county court issued its judgment, though, there was no way for the county court to alter its opinion to put the parties in their proper state. The Chancery Court concluded that this situation was therefore a fine case for equitable relief.<br />
<br />
The Court also noted that, as Bullock the younger admitted, Bullock the elder had no more property to seize to satisfy the rest of the award. Returning the execution and proceeding further in court would likely lead to prison for Bullock the elder, which Bullock the younger said he did not want. Because Bullock the younger had nothing to gain by Clough returning the execution, Bullock the younger could not have been injured by Clough's actions. <br />
<br />
The Chancery Court said that fining Goodall would lead to the perverse result of Bullock the younger being in a better position by Clough not returning the execution than by Clough returning it. Moreover, because Thompson's indicated that Bullock the younger told Clough there was no hurry in returning the execution, then sued Clough for not promptly returning it, the Chancery Court found that Bullock the younger was "guilty of a foul fraud. . .venial in the eyes of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Coke Edward Coke]". <br />
<br />
The Chancery Court also said that the county court seemed to be unaware of Bullock the younger's fraud. Even so, the Chancery Court noted that the county court did not make much use of its statutory discretion and hit Goodall with almost the maximum possible fine. The Chancery Court goes into the etymological origins of the word "discretion" to emphasize that even if the county court felt a fine proper, it should have adjusted the fine to fit the harm.<br />
<br />
The Court proceeds to review the principles underlying the court of equity's powers to justify its action in this case, even when involving a penalty authorized by statute. The Court calls on humanity's instinct for sympathy and cites the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Rule Golden Rule] along with a quote from the play [[Publii Terentii Afri Comoediae Sex|Heauton Timorumenos]]: ''"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto."'' ("I am a human being, I consider nothing that is human alien to me.")<ref>Terence, ''Heauton Timorumenos'' 1.1.25.</ref><br />
<br />
The Court's opinion by Wythe proceeds with several hypotheticals involving [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gnaeus_Julius_Agricola Agricola] selling corn to Mercator to show how one person could technically breach a contract and be subject to a severe penalty, even though that breach might have put the other party in a better position than if the contract had been fulfilled.<ref>These hypotheticals include an interesting footnote (presumably from Wythe) that indicates that the phrase "a penny saved is a penny earned" goes back quite earlier than [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin Poor Richard]; it is a translation of [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicero Cicero's] phrase ''magnum vectigal fit parsimonia'' from his Sixth Paradox.</ref> In such situations, courts of law would traditionally require Agricola to pay Mercator to pay the full penalty for breaching the contract -- even if the breach put Mercator in a better position -- because that was what the law dictated. The Court uses a quote from [[Titi Livii Historiarum Quod Extat|Livy's Histories]] to describe the traditional law: ''leges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse. . .nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere'' ("the law was a deaf inexorable being. . .admitted of no relaxation or indulgence.")<ref>Livy, ''Titi Livii Historiarum Quod Extat'', (Amstelodami: Apud D. Elzevirium, 1678), lib. II, cap. 3. Wythe seems to be guilty of cherry-picking a quote here. He omitted the middle of Levi's phrase, which reads in full, "leges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse, salubriorem melioremque inopi quam potenti; nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere, si modum excesseris" ("the law was a deaf inexorable being, better and more beneficial for the disadvantaged than the powerful, admitted of no relaxation or indulgence.") Livy seemed to view the law's intrangience as a benefit, offering greater equality for the lower classes, while Wythe altered Livy's sentence to show this inexorability as a flaw.</ref> Wythe views the court of equity as an embodiment of justice such as Pallas Athena in [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orestes#Aeschylus Aeschylus's rendering of the tale of Orestes], conjuring a just and fair verdict when the letter of the law might dictate otherwise. This, the Chancery Court says, is why a court of equity such as it has the power to dissolve the injunction Bullock won, whether the injunction was given by the power of a statute or of common law. <br />
<br />
==Works Cited or Referenced by Wythe==<br />
===Cicero's ''Stoic Paradoxes''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">Ciceros ''magnum vectigal fit parsimonia''...is translated, by english lexicographers, ‘a penny saved is a penny got.’</span></tt> Translation: ''Frugality makes great revenue.''<ref>Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery'', 335.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
===Livy's ''History of Rome''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''[L]eges rem surdam, inexorabilem esse, - nihil laxamenti nec veniae habere.''</span></tt> Translation: ''[L]aws are deaf things, inexorable – they do not consider relaxing or pardon.'' Wythe uses this to illustrate how the law has viewed the stringency of contracts.<ref>Ibid.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
===Terence's ''The Self-Tormentor''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">''[H]omo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.''</span></tt> Translation: ''I am a human being: I consider nothing that is human alien to me.''<ref>Ibid., 334.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
===Aeschylus's ''The Eumenides''===<br />
Quotation in Wythe's opinion:<br />
<br />
<blockquote><br />
<tt><span style="color: #006600;">[T]he design of the law compelling payment of penalties for non-performance of contracts was that the delinquent parties should make ''αντιδοσισ (antidosis)'', and thereby do justice.</span></tt> Translation: ''an exchange.''<ref>Ibid., 336.</ref><br />
</blockquote><br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*[[Between Goodall and Bullock]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52406User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-05T17:32:13Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his ''Reports'' to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'', and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a fair expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Wythe's cases often involved arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, frequently resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the background needed to put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading ''Wythe's Reports'', the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in ''[[Southall v. M'Keand]]'' is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to ''[[Burnsides v. Reid]]'' are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of ''[[Turpin v. Turpin]]'', however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports give the modern reader a peek into one of the great legal minds of the United States's early days. They are not just a recitation of the cases that came before the Virginia High Court of Chancery; they are an expression of Wythe's legal theories, and a snapshot of life in Virginia during Wythe's time. Wythepedia has created summaries of the cases in Wythe's Reports to bring Wythe's commentaries on the law to a new generation, both in the legal world and outside it. We hope you find it useful.<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52404User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-05T16:57:40Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his ''Reports'' to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'', and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a fair expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Wythe's cases often involved arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, frequently resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the background needed to put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading ''Wythe's Reports'', the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in ''[[Southall v. M'Keand]]'' is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to ''[[Burnsides v. Reid]]'' are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of ''[[Turpin v. Turpin]]'', however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in ''Wythe's Reports'' in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52402User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-05T16:54:10Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his ''Reports'' to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'', and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a fair expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Wythe's cases often involved arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, frequently resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the background needed to put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52400User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-05T16:50:58Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his ''Reports'' to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'', and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52398User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-05T16:50:10Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed while sitting on the bench of Virginia's High Court of Chancery. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his ''Reports'' to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52396User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T21:07:06Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of the ''Reports'' that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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''Wythe's Reports'' are a bit different than many other case compilations, which are often called "case reporters". Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his ''Reports'', since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding the rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52394User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T21:05:53Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. The polyglot Wythe could read several modern languages, as well as Ancient Greek and Classical Latin.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52392User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T20:46:56Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of his ''bete noire'''s ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52390User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T20:46:08Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Take a look at Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]] for more information on his rivalry with Wythe. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> Pendleton, on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52388User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T20:43:50Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]]. Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it. Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> For more on Wythe Pendleton's rivalry, see Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]]. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52386User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:59:52Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
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Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's relative obscurity is that he was one of the most important figures in the early days of the new American nation. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> For more on Wythe Pendleton's rivalry, see Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]]. Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the ''Reports'' were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Better, Kirtland says, to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52384User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:51:57Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
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Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> For more on Wythe Pendleton's rivalry, see Wythepedia's page on [[Edmund Pendleton]]. Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52382User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:46:14Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but ''Hamilton: The Musical'' has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
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Not as many historians have opted to tell Wythe's story compared to his Revolutionary compatriots. Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known Founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and [[Edmund Pendleton]], the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52380User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:43:58Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Kirtland, 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and [[Edmund Pendleton]], the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52378User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:43:09Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986): 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown. For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].<br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and [[Edmund Pendleton]], the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52376User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:37:02Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
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Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and [[Edmund Pendleton]], the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton, and understanding these rivalry between these two jurisprudential giants, two of the most respected figures in Revolutionary-era Virginia, is important to understanding the tone and organization of ''Wythe's Reports''. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
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So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52374User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:34:11Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and when it comes to George Wythe, it is an excellent question: Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52372User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:33:16Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52370User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:32:35Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52368User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:31:43Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
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Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
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Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
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Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52366User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:27:38Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as ''Wythe's Reports''.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52364User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:27:02Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br><br />
''who dies''<br><br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as "Wythe's Reports".<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52362User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:26:26Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives''<br />
''who dies''<br />
''who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as "Wythe's Reports".<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
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Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
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The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
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But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52360User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:26:07Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
''Who lives<br />
who dies<br />
who tells your story?''<ref>"Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).</ref><br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
<br />
Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
<br />
The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as "Wythe's Reports".<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
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This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
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Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
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Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
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Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
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Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
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''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
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Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
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==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=User:Fwding/Sandbox&diff=52358User:Fwding/Sandbox2016-09-02T19:25:18Z<p>Fwding: </p>
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<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''An Introduction to ''Wythe's Reports}}<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
"Who lives/who dies/who tells your story?" -- "Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Tells Your Story?", Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American Musical, lyrics at http://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-who-lives-who-dies-who-tells-your-story-lyrics (visited Aug. 12, 2016).<br />
<br />
Alexander Hamilton did not spend much time in Williamsburg, but Hamilton: The Musical has spurred many Americans' interest in the Founding Fathers, and this song makes an excellent entry point for talking about George Wythe, because this question is a very good one when it comes to Wythe. Who tells his story? Not Wythe, who shunned the limelight and did not believe his thoughts were worth keeping for posterity. Thomas Jefferson said he had often seen Wythe toss the documents he created while working on a case into the fire upon the case's conclusion.<ref>Kirtland, 5-6.</ref> In the early 19th century, someone wanted to compile and publish the notes Wythe made as William & Mary's Professor of Law and Police, and asked Jefferson to edit the collection. Jefferson declined, saying that it had been far too long since he had practiced law and he could not give Wythe's papers the treatment they deserved.<ref>[[Jefferson-Tyler Correspondence|Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gov. John Tyler, Sr., Nov. 25, 1810]].</ref> No one took Jefferson's place, and Wythe's notes have since scattered to places unknown.<ref>For more information on the fate of Wythe's personal papers, see the Wythepedia article [[Wythe's Lost Papers]].</ref> <br />
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Go to a library, and you will see shelf upon shelf filled with biographies of the better-known founders: Jefferson, Washington, Franklin, Madison, Adams, and so on. If you turn on the TV or go to the movies (or now, go to Broadway), you do not have to make much effort to find one of these big names portrayed. All the books written about Wythe, however, could fit nicely on a coffee table. Where are Wythe's portrayals? Who tells his story?<br />
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The shame of Wythe's obscurity is that he was arguably one of the most important of the Founding Fathers. Wythe educated many of the important legal minds of the United States's early days. His actions as a lawyer and chancellor greatly influenced the early development of the body of law in Virginia and in the new nation. One of Wythe's biographers, Robert B. Kirtland, noted that Wythe was "one of the few Americans of the Revolutionary era who understood the law profoundly, both by experience and by study."<ref>Robert B. Kirtland, ''George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge'' (New York: Garland, 1986): 14.</ref> Wythe's story is too important to be left unheard, which is why the William & Mary Law Library created Wythepedia to tell it.<br />
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Fortunately, even though Wythe did not care much for publicity, and many of the papers that could shed light on his thinking are gone, we do have some tools that can provide insight into his mind. The most important is the collection of decisions he handed down as a chancellor. Wythe compiled a book of these cases, now known as "Wythe's Reports".<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Wythe's Reports|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery]]'' (Richmond: Printed by Thomas Nicolson, 1795).</ref> Several decades after Wythe died, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Blake_Minor Benjamin Blake Minor] edited a second edition of Wythe's reports that added some more decisions Wythe had arranged to be published after the first edition came out.<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]],'' 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852).</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are a bit different than many other case compilations (often called "case reporters"). Most reporters just publish the text of the judge's decision in a case. It seems as if Wythe wanted his Reports to be more than a mere recitation of judicial proceedings. It is hard to know exactly what Wythe intended to accomplish by publishing his Reports, since we cannot (short of supernatural means) ask him directly. B.B. Minor thought that Wythe wanted to "vindicate" his decisions that had been reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.<ref>B. B. Minor, Memoir of the Author in Wythe, ''Decisions of Cases,'' 2nd ed., xxii.</ref> Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, the Court of Appeals's President, followed similar career paths and worked together well during the Revoultion. The academic, introverted Wythe, however, stood in stark contrast to the gregarious Pendleton in other ways. One of the most important differences was their attitude towards the law and its interpretation. Pendleton was practical, and viewed the law as something that needed to be adjusted and adapted to the situation. This often failed to jibe with Wythe's opinion that the law had definite boundaries, and while flexibility within those bounds is important, those borders should never be crossed, no matter the justification. Pendleton's rise to a position where he could impose his interpretation over Wythe's must have irked Wythe. One could understand why Wythe would want to write down his opinions on the law for posterity in the hopes that future generations would see the error of Pendleton's ways.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> Wythe biographer Robert Kirtland, however, says that to view Wythe's Reports as a bitter jeremiad is to misinterpret it; most of the decisions in the Rerports were not even reversed.<ref>Kirtland, 209.</ref> Kirtland argues that it is better to think of Wythe's Reports as a sort of treatise -- a collection of Wythe's musings on the law of Virginia -- Just as Wythe's student [[St. George Tucker]] published a version of [[Tucker's Blackstone|Blackstone]] with his own commentary to describe the state of the law in Virginia and what Tucker thought the law should be. <br />
<br />
So what do Wythe's Reports tell us about their author? The first thing the reader may notice is Wythe's perpetual thirst for knowledge and his desire to pass that knowledge on to others. Wythe himself is one of the first and finest examples of his instructional ability. Wythe was largely self-taught, but compatriots regarded him as one of the most intelligent men of their generation. He could read several modern languages, and he also knew the Greek and Latin classics - in their original language.<ref>Wythe Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge," ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1010.</ref> Wythe's intellect can work to both the advantage and disadvantage of the present-day reader. Many Wythe opinions are miniature lessons in the law, but those lessons often feels like they take the form of a Socratic dialogue with Wythe, not a passive lecture. Those who went to law school may get flashbacks, and the reader might feel as if they forgot to do their homework. Wythe assumed that a person reading his reports would have a good grounding in at least Latin, the major Greek and Roman tragedies, comedies, and epics, as well as the works of more modern authors such as Shakespeare, Dante, and Cervantes. Many of Wythe's opinions are rife with references to the works of ancient Greek and Latin scholars, the sixth-century [[Corpus Juris Civilis]], and English scholars closer to Wythe's time such as [[Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England|Coke]]. More often than not, classics and legal works would be quoted in their Latin or Greek versions. Sometimes Wythe would provide an English summary of the point, but often not. Wythe had no qualms about repurposing the classics for his own purpose; when quoting them, he would sometimes correct the Latin to better fit the sentences he was using the quotes for.<ref>Richard J. Hoffman, "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800," ''American Journal of Legal History'' 22 (1978): 59.</ref> Wythe would even go so far as to contort excerpts out of context to fit his purpose. In [[Goodall v. Bullock]], Wythe selectively quotes Livy's ''History of Rome'' to support an argument diametrically opposed to Livy's original statement. Wythe's allusions to literary works was hardly unusual; modern judges still cite to literature and popular culture. These days, however, such references are footnoted -- usually with a brief explanation for the use of the quote.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' ''Rapanos v. U.S.'', 547 U.S. 715, 727 n.2 (2006).</ref> Wythe might indicate that he was quoting something through italics or quotation marks, but he usually left it to the reader to understand where the reference came from and why Wythe included it. No hand-holding for his students. This was not an unreasonable expectation in Wythe's day. Many of the Founders received classical educations and were well-versed in Latin and Greek, as well as in Roman law.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 58-61.</ref> Wythe's passion for classical references did, however, cause some difficulty in committing his decisions to paper. Noted politician [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Clay Henry Clay] clerked for Wythe at the Chancery Court, and part of his duties were to transcribe Wythe's dictation of his cases (Wythe had trouble writing in those days because of gout). Clay, however, did "not (understand) a single Greek character", and thus had great trouble writing down the citations from Greek authors Wythe wanted to include in the reports. Clay said that he ended up copying the Greek characters from Wythe's original decisions.<ref>Henry Clay to B.B. Minor, May 3, 1851, reproduced in Minor, xxxii-xxxiii.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe's decisions also assume that the reader is familiar with contemporary political developments. This was a reasonable expectation for lawyers before his bench, but the average reader in the 21st century will find they have to engage in some historical research. A large portion of the High Court of Chancery's caseload involved property disputes, and many of those disputes tied in to then-current events. In order to properly summarize Wythe's decisions, I found myself taking a crash course on late-18th-century Virginia history and learning a lot more about the United States during its early days. Arguments over who owned land in Virginia's western frontier were one of the more frequent subjects of cases Wythe heard. The aftermath of the French and Indian War, as well as multiple conflicting land grants, often resulted in several conflicting claims to the same piece of property. Wythepedia's article on [[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]] offers the reader the background to help put these cases in proper context. Several other cases before the High Court of Chancery involved disputes over debt. Two of the major complicating factors in these cases were usually hyperinflation in Virginia during the 1770s and the efforts the Virginia and federal governments made to deal with pre-Revolutionary debt Americans owed British citizens. In cases such as [[Page v. Pendleton]] and [[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]], Wythe had to choose between conflicting state and federal laws dealing with British creditors. Wythe's response to this dilemma illustrates his dedication to making what he believes to be the right decision, even in the face of strong public opposition. Wythepedia's article on [[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]] helps to put these cases in context. Some of Wythe's cases demonstrate the poor state of women's legal rights in late 18th-century Virginia; the state followed the rule of marital unity, which meant that a husband essentially absorbed his wife's legal identity. This sometimes led to odd-looking dockets in which a woman filed a suit that seemed to act against her own interest because it was really the husband filing in her name. Wythepedia's article on [[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]] explains. <br />
<br />
The centuries separating us from Wythe's time can present difficulties to the modern reader in other ways. Wythe sometimes refers to his sources using a shorthand contemporaries would likely know, but which are unfamiliar to people centuries removed, such as a reference in [[Turpin v. Turpin]] to simply "the book called, law of devises and revocations". Modern readers would have to do some detective work to determine that Wythe was talking about Gilbert's [[Law of Devises, Revocations, and Last Wills]]. Wythe could also reasonably assume that contemporary lawyers reading his reports would be familiar with current Virginia court procedure. Some motions that were probably common in the 18th century, but are relatively rare now, go unexplained. The 21st-century reader, however, is left pondering what it means in ''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]'' to "return the execution". By the same token, Wythe often provides little information in his decisions on the background of the case - how it arrived in the High Court of Chancery. The modern reader who does not know 18th-century Virginian court and chancery procedure may find themselves wondering why the parties are before Wythe, what the parties want him to do, and what events led to the current controversy? Several times while reading Wythe's Reports, the only way to get a good grasp on these issues was to read the opinion the Supreme Court of Virginia issued after someone appealed Wythe's decision. For example, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Lyons's opinion in [[Hoomes v. Kuhn]] gives the reader more information on what evidence was presented to the High Court of Chancery than does Wythe's own opinion, which consists entirely of a single run-on sentence. Those Supreme Court decisions often came from Pendleton's hand; Pendleton, the master litigator, no doubt knew the importance of persuasive facts, even when writing from the bench. Kirtland notes that in reading many of Wythe's decisions, the legal issue at hand and how he resolved it were the only things the reader needed to worry about. Facts that did not directly affect the law that applied were irrelevant -- even unusual facts that could shed some light on the parties' actions and that readers might find relevant. Wythe describes ''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]'' as a motion for a new trial on an assault and battery lawsuit; one must read the Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion to find out that it involved a pastor who thrashed a merchant because the merchant whipped the pastor's slave on suspicion of shoplifting.<ref>Kirtland, 209-10.</ref> <br />
<br />
This selective recitation of the background can lead to frustration for the reader, such as in the case of [[Hylton v. Hunter]], in which most of Wythe's opinion seems to be heading towards one party's victory, but concludes with the other party on top -- an odd result that a more thorough explanation of prior events might have clarified. Wythe's discussion of the facts of the case occasionally jump back in forth in the timeline, Wythe going back in time to add a previously-undisclosed fact he now finds relevant. Sometimes Wythe's opinions will not provide relevant information until midway through. Someone reading [[Goodall v. Bullock]] from the beginning is left to ponder who William L. Thompson is and why he is so important until it is revealed several pages in that Mr. Thompson is a witness. It seems that Wythe is prone to the pitfall of many a brilliant mind. An expert explaining something to another person may often skip steps that are automatic and like second nature to the expert, but with which outsiders are unfamiliar. When Wythe does offer a detailed enumeration of the facts, it usually means that he thinks the law of Virginia is about to deliver a great injustice, or that the Virginia Supreme Court has gravely erred. These are often the cases where Wythe calls upon the ancient classics.<ref>''See, e.g., [[Wilkins v. Taylor]], [[Aylett v. Aylett]], [[Ross v. Pleasants]].''</ref> <br />
<br />
Comparing Wythe's opinions with Pendleton's, especially in cases in which a High Court of Chancery decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, makes for an interesting study of their contrasting personalities and attitudes towards the law. Wythe's focus on the legal principles at play to the exclusion of any fact Wythe considered extraneous epitomizes the great scholar "Wythe the Just", brilliantly debating and discussing the fledgling nation's jurisprudential path.<ref>Carol Berkin, ''A Brilliant Solution'' (New York: Harcourt, 2002): 64.</ref> [[Pendleton|Edmund Pendleton]], on the other hand, often designs his opinions to clearly explain the facts and the procedural background for anyone who knew nothing about the parties or their conflict. Pendleton seems to be an jurist concerned with ensuring that his audience was following his argument step by step. Wythe was acknowledged as arguably the most brilliant jurisprudential mind of his generation, many of his theories ahead of their time, a man with intelligence that shone through in Wythe's opinions. Pendleton's opinions, however, demonstrate that man's near-insurmountable persuasive talents. A person reading both men's opinions may be little surprised at Pendleton's ability to best Wythe in the courtroom, a feat few achieved.<ref>Kirtland, 47.</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe's Reports are more than a settling of scores with the Virginia Supreme Court, but Wythe's frustration with his brethren jurists on the state's high court comes through clearly in the language of some Wythe decisions. His opinion in [[Southall v. M'Keand]] is a multi-page diatribe against the Virginia Supreme Court, taking apart the higher court's opinion piece by piece. Wythe's sarcastic opening headnotes to [[Burnsides v. Reid]] are the words of a man quietly banging his head against the desk in frustration. Throughout the Reports, as Wythe explains the basis of his decisions and how the other courts erred, or how the very law of Virginia itself is in error, the reader may get the impression of a man who cannot understand why the world does not understand the correctness of his position, a man who feels that if he just explains his reasoning slowly and carefully enough, perhaps with a verbal rap to the knuckles, then finally they will see the error of their ways. This would fit in with the image of a George Wythe who, over the years, developed an intractable rivalry with the glad-handing Pendleton.<ref>Kirtland, 47-54.</ref> <br />
<br />
But what about Wythe's legal philosophy, the reason Wythe published his Reports in the first place? What do Wythe's opinions tell us about Wythe's interpretation of the law -- how he thought it stood, and how he thought it should be? One thing that quickly becomes apparent is that Wythe held no love for the legal precedent set by English courts, sentiments that were hardly unusual during the new nation's infancy. A substantial number of American legal minds felt it was their patriotic duty to reject English law in the heat of the Revolution's wake. Add to that warm American feelings towards their French benefactors, and there was a reasonable chance that many of the new American states would adopt Continental-European-style civil law instead of the common law of their now-despised motherland.<ref>Timothy G. Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(1) (Winter 2016): 60.</ref> Wythe thoroughly lays out the folly of blindly following English precedent in ''[[Field v. Harrison]]''. In ''[[Devisme v. Martin]]'', Wythe takes time out from his opinion to write dicta criticizing English precedent on the same topic. In ''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]'', using a spot-on allusion to Cicero, he sets forth an entertaining takedown of the idea that American courts should feel bound to follow English court decision, noting that English courts would think it ridiculous to extend the same courtesy to their transatlantic brethren. In ''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]'', Chancellor Wythe states it clearly: on at least some points of law, he needs to be convinced "otherwise than by precedents only."<ref>''Rose v. Nicholas'', Wythe 268 (1794).</ref> Wythe's sentiments would continue to be shared by great jurists in the following centuries; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1897 that "(i)t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."<ref>Kasia Solon Cristobal, "From Law in Blackletter to Blackletter Law", ''Law Library Journal'' 108(2) (2016): 213, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law", ''Harvard Law Review'' 10 (1897): 469.</ref><br />
<br />
Also like many of his fellow Founders, Wythe had a fondness for Roman law, viewing it as a logic- and-reason-based alternative to the English common law.<ref>Kearley, "From Rome to the Restatement", 58.</ref> As Wythepedia's page on [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics]] notes, Wythe cited to Roman law frequently; the ''[[Corpus Juris Civilis]]'' shows up in his cases 21 times. In Wythe's day, the concept of a testament, which came from Roman-based civil law, was separate from the common-law will.<ref>John Bouvier, rev. by Francis Rawle, "Will", ''Bouvier's Law Dictionary'' (Kansas City, MO: Vernon Law Book Co., 8th ed. 1914).</ref> In the case of [[Turpin v. Turpin]], however, Wythe appears to use the term "testament" to refer to both wills and testaments, a contrast from the tendency of most modern Americans to use the term "will" to generically refer to both concepts.<ref>Bryan A. Garner, ed., "Will (2)", ''Black's Law Dictionary'' (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed. 2014): 1833.</ref> <br />
<br />
Another aspect of Wythe's jurisprudence that shines through in his decisions is his determination to see justice done, even if it flew in the face of prevailing public sentiment or established Anglo-American law. This desire for justice above other considerations and his attitude towards English precedent may help explain why he declined a seat on the Virginia Supreme Court, opting to remain on the High Court of Chancery instead. Perhaps Wythe felt that equity would allow him to craft solutions that would be off limits as a judge of the common law.<ref>Kirtland, 51, n.23. As it turns out, the common law sometimes got in the last word anyway, as Wythe's decisions could be appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.</ref> In ''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]'', Wythe deliberately crafted a method of applying a debtor's payments that was much kinder to the creditor than the normally-applied Merchant's Rule. In a few decades, however, Wythe would prevail, and the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt his formula. It is regrettable that this case also illustrates Wythe's complex, densely-packed writing style that can make his opinions difficult to decipher.<br />
<br />
''Ross v. Pleasants'' was also one of several cases that illustrated Wythe's apparently firm belief that debts should be paid, no matter the circumstances or how they change. In ''[[Page v. Pendleton]]'' and ''[[Farley v. Shippen]]'', Wythe rejected the idea that British citizens should forfeit any rights they had to repayment on debts owed before the Revolution. Wythe's opinion was unpopular in the United States's early years, and defied legislation the Virginia assembly passed to severely devalue, if not effectively eliminate, British-held debt. Parts of Virginia's elite never forgave Wythe for these rulings.<ref>George Holt, "George Wythe: Early Modern Judge", ''Alabama Law Review'' 58 (2007): 1024.</ref> Wythe may not have cared for English precedent as a rule, but he would not let such sentiments get in the way of delivering justice; ''Farley'' represents one of the rare cases in Wythe's Reports in which Chancellor Wythe goes so far as to cite English caselaw with approval. <br />
<br />
Although it may not have made him popular with his fellow Virginians, ''Page v. Pendleton'' shows Wythe in peak form. The reader experiences Wythe the professor of jurisprudence, as he debates exactly what binds a person to a body of laws, even when that person did not actively consent to living under those laws. Wythe the crusader for justice warns other judges against succumbing to blind hatred of other nations or people and decries the idea of seizing the goods of another nation's citizenry just through right of conquest. Simply following Virginia's law as the legislature wrote it would not only have been a more popular decision, but it would have given Wythe the chance to deliver a stinging defeat to the defendant -- his long-time nemesis, Edumnd Pendleton. Wythe, however, resisted temptation and stuck to his principles. How many people in similar situations would do the same? Wythe the Just and law Professor Wythe are joined by Wythe the classical scholar, who illustrates his points with excerpts from the ancient Greeks.<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Wythe%27s_Judicial_Career&diff=52026Wythe's Judicial Career2016-08-29T18:28:32Z<p>Fwding: </p>
<hr />
<div>In 1778, Wythe was appointed to the newly created High Court of Chancery. Beverly Tucker describes the choice of Wythe as a judge: <br />
<br />
<blockquote>... the people were not wholly insensible of the want of a Court of somewhat different character; and to supply that want was one of the objects, to which the framers of the new Constitution directed their attention. To do this, they established three Courts, for which sixteen Judges learned in the law were wanting. The difficulty was to find the men fit to fill these important posts. ''Integrity'' and ''talent'' were abundant, but a ''learned'' lawyer was indeed a ''rara avis.'' What motive had the lawyers had to acquire learning? With the exception of some few who had studied the profession abroad, and had not been long enough in Virginia to lose the memory of what they knew, in the loose practice prevailing here, there was but one man in the State who had any claims to the character. I speak of the venerable Chancellor Wythe, a man who differed from his contemporaries in this, because in his ordinary motives and modes of action he differed altogether from other men. Without ambition, without avarice, taking no pleasure in society, he was by nature and habit addicted to solitude, and his active mind found its only enjoyment in profound research. The languages of antiquity, the exact sciences, and the law, were the three studies which alone could be pursued with a reasonable hope of arriving at that certainty which his upright and truth-loving mind contemplated as the only object worthy of his labors. To these he devoted himself, and he became a profound lawyer for the same reason that he was a profound Greek scholar, astronomer and mathematician.<ref>Beverly Tucker, ''The Principles of Pleading,'' (Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1846), 56.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
Wythe frequently cited [[Wythe's Greek and Latin Classics|Greek and Latin classics]] in his case decisions in addition to other non-legal titles.<br />
<br />
==Chancery court cases==<br />
<br />
<div style="column-count:3;-moz-column-count:3;-webkit-column-count:3"><br />
*''[[Ambler v. Wyld]]''<br />
*''[[Aylett v. Aylett]]''<br />
*''[[Bailey v. Teackle]]''<br />
*''[[Beverley v. Rennolds]]''<br />
*''[[Burnsides v. Reid]]''<br />
*''[[Cadwallader v. Mason]]''<br />
*''[[Cary v. Buxton]]''<br />
*''[[Case upon the Statute for Distribution]]''<br />
*''[[Cobs v. Mosby]]''<br />
*''[[Cochran v. Street]]''<br />
*''[[Cole v. Scott]]''<br />
*''[[Dandridge v. Lyon]]''<br />
*''[[Dawson v. Winslow]]''<br />
*''[[Devisme v. Martin]]''<br />
*''[[Farley v. Shippen]]''<br />
*''[[Farrar v. Jackson]]''<br />
*''[[Field v. Harrison]]''<br />
*''[[Fowler v. Saunders]]''<br />
*''[[Goodall v. Bullock]]''<br />
*''[[Hamilton & Co. v. Urquhart]]''<br />
*''[[Harrison v. Allen]]''<br />
*''[[Hearne v. Roane]]''<br />
*''[[Hill v. Gregory]]''<br />
*''[[Hinde v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Hooe v. Kelsick]]''<br />
*''[[Hoomes v. Kuhn]]''<br />
*''[[Hudgins v. Wrights]]''<br />
*''[[Hylton v. Hunter]]''<br />
*''[[Jones v. White]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Braxton]]''<br />
*''[[Love v. Donelson]]''<br />
*''[[Maze v. Hamilton]]''<br />
*''[[Nance v. Woodward]]''<br />
*''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]''<br />
*''[[Overton v. Ross]]''<br />
*''[[Page v. Pendleton]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Hoomes]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Lomax]]''<br />
*''[[Pendleton v. Whiting]]''<br />
*''[[Burnsides v. Reid|Reid v. Burnsides]]''<br />
*''[[Roane v. Innis]]''<br />
*''[[Rose v. Nicholas]]''<br />
*''[[Ross v. Pines]]''<br />
*''[[Ross v. Pleasants]]''<br />
*''[[Shermer v. Richardson]]''<br />
*''[[Southall v. M'Keand]]''<br />
*''[[Turpin v. Turpin]]''<br />
*''[[Wilkins v. Taylor]]''<br />
*''[[Williams v. Jacob]]''<br />
*''[[Wilson v. Rucker]]''<br />
*''[[Woodson v. Woodson]]''<br />
*''[[Woods v. Macrae]]''<br />
*''[[Yates v. Salle]]''<br />
</div><br />
<br />
==Court of Appeals cases==<br />
*''[[Commonwealth v. Caton]]''<br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia, by the High Court of Chancery]]''<br />
*[[Land Disputes in Western Virginia]]<br />
*[[Virginia Hyperinflation and Debt]]<br />
*[[Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references /><br />
<br />
==Further reading==<br />
*Bryson, W. Hamilton. "The Use of Roman Law in Virginia Courts." In ''American Journal of Legal History'' 28 (1984): 135-146.<br />
<br />
*Hoffman, Richard J. "Classics in the Courts of the United States, 1790-1800." In ''American Journal of Legal History'' 55 (1978): 55-84.<br />
<br />
*Holt, Wythe. "[http://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2058/Issue%205/Holt.pdf George Wythe: Early Modern Judge.]" In ''Alabama Law Review'' 58, no. 5 (2007): 1009-1039.<br />
<br />
<br />
[[Category:Aspects of Wythe's Life]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Women%E2%80%99s_Legal_Rights_in_Wythe%E2%80%99s_Time&diff=52024Women’s Legal Rights in Wythe’s Time2016-08-16T18:44:10Z<p>Fwding: /* Virginia law in the early 18th century */</p>
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<div>__NOTOC__[[File:SterneWorksOfLaurenceSterne1780V5Illustration.jpg|right|thumb|375px|<center>Illustration, volume 5, ''[[Works of Laurence Sterne|The Works of Laurence Sterne]].</center>]]<br />
Going through Wythe's Chancery Court's decisions, a reader might notice that whenever a woman is a party in a case, she is almost always represented by a man, often the woman's husband. This comes from women's unfortunate legal position in Wythe's day. <br />
==Virginia law in the early 18th century==<br />
Virginian law in the early 18th century was a mixed bag for women. The English common law rule of ''coverture'' meant that married women could only sue in court through their husband's name, and that contracts wives agreed to before and during the marriage were void.<ref>"coverture", ''Black's Law Dictionary'', Bryan A. Garner, ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 10th ed., 2014): 446; Davis Thomas Konig, "Regionalism in Early American Law," in ''The Cambridge History of Law in America: Volume I: Early America (1580-1815)'', edited by Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 172.</ref> Virginia, however, would often use courts of equity to help married women and widows keep control of what they owned.<ref>Konig, "Regionalism in Early American Law," 172.</ref> Virginia women could also take advantage of the common-law rule of ''dower'', which gave a widow the right to one-third of her late husband's estate and some of his belongings for the rest of the widow's life. The rule of dower also said that husbands could not sell any real estate the couple owned while they were married unless the wife approved. A magistrate was required to speak privately with the wife to make sure that the husband wasn't forcing the wife to agree. Married women in Virginia during this time could also take advantage of the English law of ''separate estates''. Under this rule, the wife's land and belongings were held in trust for her and reserved for her use.<ref>Ibid., 173.</ref><br />
<br />
==Wythe's era and Blackstone's rule of marital unity==<br />
By the late 18th century, though, women lost many of the protections under the common law they had before. Virginia followed the rule Blackstone wrote in his ''Commentaries''&mdash; an even stricter implementation of the idea of "unity of person between the husband and wife; it being held that they are one person in law, so that the very being and existence of the woman is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged or incorporated in that of the husband."<ref>William Blackstone, ''[[Commentaries on the Laws of England]]'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1766), 2:433.</ref> The wife still had the right of dower in real estate she brought into the marriage, so her husband was only entitled to the profits made off of that land. Any personal property the wife brought to the marriage, however, was free to be disposed of as the husband desired.<ref>Ibid.</ref> The option for a separate estate for the wife's belongings and land was no more.<ref>Holly Brewer, "The Transformation of Domestic Law," in ''The Cambridge History of Law in America: Volume I: Early America (1580-1815)'', edited by Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008), 317-318.</ref> <br />
<br />
If a wife wished to file suit in court, or it someone wanted to sue her, it would still have to be done through her husband's name.<ref>Blackstone, ''Commentaries on the Laws of England'', 1:430-431.</ref> Blackstone's rule of a "union of person in husband and wife" likely led to some cases filed in the name of the wife that ran against the wife's true interest - say, by a husband trying to add to the "marital" (read his) property by suing to get rid of an inconvenient restriction.<ref>Edmund Pendleton thought that such trickery was afoot in the case of ''[[Fowler v. Saunders]]''.</ref> <br />
<br />
Blackstone thought that his strict rule of marital unity was for the benefit of women, saying that "(s)o great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England."<ref>Blackstone, ''Commentaries on the Laws of England'', 1:433.</ref>. [[St. George Tucker]], William & Mary's second Professor of Law and Police, was not convinced. In his commentaries on Blackstone, Tucker wrote that "(n)othing, I apprehend, would more conciliate the good will of the student in favour of the laws of England, than a persuasion that they had shewn a partiality to the female sex. But I am not so much in love with my subject as to be inclined to leave it in possession of a glory which it may not justly deserve."<ref>William Blackstone and St. George Tucker, ''[[Blackstone's Commentaries|Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia]]'' (Philadelphia: William Young Birch and Abraham Small, 1803): 2:445, fn. *.</ref><br />
<br />
Equity courts, however, made efforts to give women separate property rights they had under the common law before Blackstone's doctrine took hold.<ref>Brewer, "The Transformation of Domestic Law," 317-18.</ref> As the chancellor for Virginia's High Court of Chancery, Wythe followed in this tradition, doing what he could to protect women's property rights against ill-intentioned guardians and husbands.<ref>See ''[[Shermer v. Richardson]]'' for an example.</ref> Wythe's high opinion of civil law traditions may have also played a part. As Blackstone noted, under the civil law followed by many European nations, "the husband and the wife are considered as two distinct persons ; and may have separate estates, contracts, debts, and injuries".<ref>Blackstone and Tucker, ''Blackstone's Commentaries'', 2:444.</ref><br />
<br />
==See also==<br />
*[[Wythe's Judicial Career]]<br />
<br />
==References==<br />
<references/></div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Donelson&diff=37268Love v. Donelson2015-03-31T21:34:36Z<p>Fwding: /* Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't */ Edit a citation and correct the title to Nicomachean Ethics</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Donelson''}}<br />
[[Image:LoveAgainstDonelson1800P1.jpg|thumb|right|400px|Page one from [[George Wythe|George Wythe's]] pamphlet, "[[Love against Donelson|Love, Against Donelson and Hodgson]]" (1801?). Copy at the [http://lccn.loc.gov/22003059 Library of Congress.] ]]<br />
''Love v. Donelson''<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Love against Donelson|Love, against Donelson and Hodgson]]'' (Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1801?).</ref> involved a buyer of land who paid for his purchase with a bond. The buyer was entitled to a partial discount against the original seller of the land, but the original seller transferred the bond to another person who did not know about the possibility of a refund. The court discussed whether the new owner of the bond had to give the original buyer of the land the same discount as the original seller. The opinion is an example of Wythe severely criticizing the Virginia Supreme Court for their interpretation of a statute, and also features Wythe possibly misquoting Aristotle indirectly.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Love bought land from Donelson. Love knew, both through talking with relevant people in Knoxville (in what is now Tennessee) and by examining the map attached to the sales contract, that the land he bought was part of territory that the Cherokee Nation claimed and had not ceded to Great Britain or to the United States. In the contract, Donelson said that he would warrant and sponsor Love's claim against anyone, including the Cherokee. Love paid for the land in the form of a bond, which Donelson later sold to Hodgson. Hodgson claimed that he did not know about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims when he bought the bond.<br />
<br />
The American government ceded at least part of Love's land to the Cherokee under a treaty,<ref>Wythe does not specify which treaty. He might be referring to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Holston Treaty of Holston] of 1791, but Wythe talks about land "abdicated by the british americans" (''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'' at 2), which implies that it was a treaty from the pre-Revolutionary days. Perhaps the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hard_Labour Treaty of Hard Labour] or the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lochaber Treaty of Lochaber]?</ref> <br />
<br />
Hodgson filed suit and won a judgment to claim payment on the bond in 1796. Love filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery to enjoin that judgment so that Love could reduce his required payment in proportion to the amount of land that was ceded to the Cherokee.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
Wythe dismissed Love's petition, with costs. Wythe said that Love's relief against Donelson was an equitable one, not a legal one, and that equitable relief only transfers to the purchaser of a bond if that purchaser knew that the relief existed when they bought the bond. Wythe acknowleged, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court had held differently, and devoted the bulk of the opinion to a discussion of why the judges from that court were in error.<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe noted that if Hodgson had known about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims or that Love did not have proper title to that land when Hodgson accepted the bond, then Love would be entitled to the relief he requested. The evidence, however, did not show that Hodgson knew either of these things when he purchased it. Therefore, Wythe said, the equitable element of Love's claim sticks to his legal claim against Hodgson no better than the feet and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made partly of iron and partly of clay -- partly strong, and partly broken.<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 24, ''referring to'' Daniel 2: 33, 42.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe pointed to one of his earlier decisions, ''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]'', in which he stated that the debtor on a payment bond could not get relief against someone who purchased a bond from the original creditor of a bond if that purchaser did not know about the unfairness involved in the bond's original creation.<ref>''Overstreet v. Randolph'', George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 47.</ref> However, Wythe also noted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in ''Norton v. Rose'', which stated that the person who is assigned a bond or obligation is subject to everything the original creditor was subject to.<ref>''Norton v. Rose'', 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 254 (1796).</ref> <br />
<br />
In classic Wythe form, the bulk of the opinion in ''Love'' involves Wythe dissecting the Virginia Supreme Court's ''Norton v. Rose'' opinion, practically line by line (it is presumably no coincidence that the ''Norton'' opinion reversed one of Wythe's decrees, as Wythe takes pains to point out multiple times). Wythe's primary criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in ''Norton'' is that the judges created a legislative intent from whole cloth, reading meaning into the language of the relevant statute<ref>Ch. 33, October 1748 Session, "An act for ascertaining the damage upon protested bills of exchange; and for the better recovery of debts due on promissory notes; and for the assignment of bonds, obligations, and notes," William Waller Hening, ed., ''The Statutes at Large; being a collection of all the laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619'' (Richmond, VA: Printed for the Editor at the Franklin Press -- W. W. Gray, Printer, 1819), 6: 85.</ref> that was not there.<br />
<br />
===Judge Roane, "far the best of augurs"===<br />
Wythe mockingly compares Judge [[Spencer Roane]]'s ability to divine the legislature's intent to that of "Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of augurs."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 14. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calchas Calchas] was a seer from Greek myth who got his gift for divining from Apollo.</ref> <br />
<br />
===Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't===<br />
Wythe later turns his attention to Judge [http://scvahistory.org/lyons-peter-1779-1809-2/ Peter Lyons]'s statement in ''Norton'' that "the accuracy of the principle (Wythe describes) is not questioned; its application to (''Norton'') is."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> Wythe criticizes this statement by quoting a passage from Book II, Chapter III of Jean-Jacques Barthelemy's [[Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece]]. In the passage, Barthelemy says Aristotle the residents of the island of Lesbos as people who "relaxed their principles of morality, as occasion required, and adapted themselves to circumstances with as much facility as they open and shut certain leaden rules used by their architects".<ref>Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, ''Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece'' (London: Printed for J. Johnson, et al., 4th ed. 1806), 2: 52-3, ''available at'' [http://digital.library.villanova.edu/Collection/vudl:2955 Villanova University Digital Library] (last visited March 27, 2015).</ref> The "leaden rules" refer to flexible rulers used by architects to measure irregular curves. These rulers were called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesbian_rule "Lesbian rules"] because they were originally made of lead from the island of Lesbos. A handwritten note in Wythe's copy of the opinion cites a page from John Taylor's ''[[Elements of the Civil Law]]'' that mentions the "''Norma Lesbia'', which shapes itself to every thing."<ref>John Taylor, ''Elements of the Civil Law'' (London: Charles Bathurst, 3d ed. 1769), 482.</ref> Wythe concludes his opinion by stating that the laws of equity are not as flexible as those leaden architects' rules, and that in a situation such as the one currently before the Chancery, in which Love's and Hodgson's equities are equal, but Hodgson's legal rights are greater, Hodgson must win.<br />
<br />
In a footnote, Wythe describes a discussion he had with "Watkins Leigh, one of William and Mary's ornaments",<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> presumably referring to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_W._Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh].<ref>B.W. Leigh graduated from William & Mary in 1802 and "studied law" according to his [http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000232 Congressional biography]. Wythe describing Leigh as "the ingenious student" implies that Wythe taught Leigh, but we have no definite proof one way or the other.</ref> Leigh contended that Aristotle said nothing about the people of Lesbos "relax(ing) their principles of morality", and that Barthelemy probably got that idea instead from [[Diodōrou tou Sikeliōtou Bibliothēkēs Historikēs ta Sōzomena|Siculus Didorus]]. Aristotle does mention the Lesbian Rule in Book V, Chapter 10, of ''Nicomachean Ethics'', but in a positive sense - the opposite of Wythe's intent of alluding to the Rule.<ref>"In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts." Aristotle, ''Nicomachean Ethics'', Book V, Ch. 10, as found in [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html The Internet Classics Archive] (last visited March 26, 2015).</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe conceded that he "had not then consulted Aristotle" when writing the opinion, but says that his reading of Siculus shows that that book did not opine on the moral character of the people of that island, either. Wythe concludes his footnote by saying "that (the people of Lesbos) were not slandered by Barthelemy seemeth to be proved by other authors."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> The admission by such a great scholar of the Greek and Roman classics as Wythe that he did not bother to verify the citation to Aristotle, along with an offhanded assertion that other, unnamed authors said the same thing anyway, are puzzling.<br />
<br />
===Wythe's conclusion from Horace===<br />
Wythe concludes his opinion with a quote from [[Q. Horatii Flacci Opera|Horace's ''Satires'']]. Wythe has "no doubt" that Rose will appeal the Chancery Court's decision, and Wythe expresses the hope that the Virginia Supreme Court will take the opportunity to uphold Wythe and overrule the precedent they set in ''Norton v. Rose''. Such a decision, Wythe said, would only be relished by ''uni aequus virtuti atque ejus amicis'' -- "a friend equally to virtue and to virtue's friends".<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 33, ''quoting'' ''Horatii Satirarum'', Book II, Satire 1, Line 70.</ref><br />
<br />
===References===<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Donelson&diff=37266Love v. Donelson2015-03-31T21:22:48Z<p>Fwding: Deleted line about Book V of Aristotle's Manichean Ethics only having eleven chapters - might not be true. Depends on which edition you get, apparently. Also tweaked last line in summary paragraph at top.</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Donelson''}}<br />
[[Image:LoveAgainstDonelson1800P1.jpg|thumb|right|400px|Page one from [[George Wythe|George Wythe's]] pamphlet, "[[Love against Donelson|Love, Against Donelson and Hodgson]]" (1801?). Copy at the [http://lccn.loc.gov/22003059 Library of Congress.] ]]<br />
''Love v. Donelson''<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Love against Donelson|Love, against Donelson and Hodgson]]'' (Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1801?).</ref> involved a buyer of land who paid for his purchase with a bond. The buyer was entitled to a partial discount against the original seller of the land, but the original seller transferred the bond to another person who did not know about the possibility of a refund. The court discussed whether the new owner of the bond had to give the original buyer of the land the same discount as the original seller. The opinion is an example of Wythe severely criticizing the Virginia Supreme Court for their interpretation of a statute, and also features Wythe possibly misquoting Aristotle indirectly.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Love bought land from Donelson. Love knew, both through talking with relevant people in Knoxville (in what is now Tennessee) and by examining the map attached to the sales contract, that the land he bought was part of territory that the Cherokee Nation claimed and had not ceded to Great Britain or to the United States. In the contract, Donelson said that he would warrant and sponsor Love's claim against anyone, including the Cherokee. Love paid for the land in the form of a bond, which Donelson later sold to Hodgson. Hodgson claimed that he did not know about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims when he bought the bond.<br />
<br />
The American government ceded at least part of Love's land to the Cherokee under a treaty,<ref>Wythe does not specify which treaty. He might be referring to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Holston Treaty of Holston] of 1791, but Wythe talks about land "abdicated by the british americans" (''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'' at 2), which implies that it was a treaty from the pre-Revolutionary days. Perhaps the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hard_Labour Treaty of Hard Labour] or the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lochaber Treaty of Lochaber]?</ref> <br />
<br />
Hodgson filed suit and won a judgment to claim payment on the bond in 1796. Love filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery to enjoin that judgment so that Love could reduce his required payment in proportion to the amount of land that was ceded to the Cherokee.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
Wythe dismissed Love's petition, with costs. Wythe said that Love's relief against Donelson was an equitable one, not a legal one, and that equitable relief only transfers to the purchaser of a bond if that purchaser knew that the relief existed when they bought the bond. Wythe acknowleged, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court had held differently, and devoted the bulk of the opinion to a discussion of why the judges from that court were in error.<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe noted that if Hodgson had known about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims or that Love did not have proper title to that land when Hodgson accepted the bond, then Love would be entitled to the relief he requested. The evidence, however, did not show that Hodgson knew either of these things when he purchased it. Therefore, Wythe said, the equitable element of Love's claim sticks to his legal claim against Hodgson no better than the feet and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made partly of iron and partly of clay -- partly strong, and partly broken.<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 24, ''referring to'' Daniel 2: 33, 42.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe pointed to one of his earlier decisions, ''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]'', in which he stated that the debtor on a payment bond could not get relief against someone who purchased a bond from the original creditor of a bond if that purchaser did not know about the unfairness involved in the bond's original creation.<ref>''Overstreet v. Randolph'', George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 47.</ref> However, Wythe also noted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in ''Norton v. Rose'', which stated that the person who is assigned a bond or obligation is subject to everything the original creditor was subject to.<ref>''Norton v. Rose'', 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 254 (1796).</ref> <br />
<br />
In classic Wythe form, the bulk of the opinion in ''Love'' involves Wythe dissecting the Virginia Supreme Court's ''Norton v. Rose'' opinion, practically line by line (it is presumably no coincidence that the ''Norton'' opinion reversed one of Wythe's decrees, as Wythe takes pains to point out multiple times). Wythe's primary criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in ''Norton'' is that the judges created a legislative intent from whole cloth, reading meaning into the language of the relevant statute<ref>Ch. 33, October 1748 Session, "An act for ascertaining the damage upon protested bills of exchange; and for the better recovery of debts due on promissory notes; and for the assignment of bonds, obligations, and notes," William Waller Hening, ed., ''The Statutes at Large; being a collection of all the laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619'' (Richmond, VA: Printed for the Editor at the Franklin Press -- W. W. Gray, Printer, 1819), 6: 85.</ref> that was not there.<br />
<br />
===Judge Roane, "far the best of augurs"===<br />
Wythe mockingly compares Judge [[Spencer Roane]]'s ability to divine the legislature's intent to that of "Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of augurs."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 14. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calchas Calchas] was a seer from Greek myth who got his gift for divining from Apollo.</ref> <br />
<br />
===Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't===<br />
Wythe later turns his attention to Judge [http://scvahistory.org/lyons-peter-1779-1809-2/ Peter Lyons]'s statement in ''Norton'' that "the accuracy of the principle (Wythe describes) is not questioned; its application to (''Norton'') is."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> Wythe criticizes this statement by quoting a passage from Book II, Chapter III of Jean-Jacques Barthelemy's [[Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece]]. In the passage, Barthelemy says Aristotle the residents of the island of Lesbos as people who "relaxed their principles of morality, as occasion required, and adapted themselves to circumstances with as much facility as they open and shut certain leaden rules used by their architects".<ref>Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, ''Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece'' (London: Printed for J. Johnson, et al., 4th ed. 1806), 2: 52-3, ''available at'' [http://digital.library.villanova.edu/Collection/vudl:2955 Villanova University Digital Library] (last visited March 27, 2015).</ref> The "leaden rules" refer to flexible rulers used by architects to measure irregular curves. These rulers were called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesbian_rule "Lesbian rules"] because they were originally made of lead from the island of Lesbos. A handwritten note in Wythe's copy of the opinion cites a page from John Taylor's ''[[Elements of the Civil Law]]'' that mentions the "''Norma Lesbia'', which shapes itself to every thing."<ref>John Taylor, ''Elements of the Civil Law'' (London: Charles Bathurst, 3d ed. 1769), 482.</ref> Wythe concludes his opinion by stating that the laws of equity are not as flexible as those leaden architects' rules, and that in a situation such as the one currently before the Chancery, in which Love's and Hodgson's equities are equal, but Hodgson's legal rights are greater, Hodgson must win.<br />
<br />
In a footnote, Wythe describes a discussion he had with "Watkins Leigh, one of William and Mary's ornaments",<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> presumably referring to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_W._Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh].<ref>B.W. Leigh graduated from William & Mary in 1802 and "studied law" according to his [http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000232 Congressional biography]. Wythe describing Leigh as "the ingenious student" implies that Wythe taught Leigh, but we have no definite proof one way or the other.</ref> Leigh contended that Aristotle said nothing about the people of Lesbos "relax(ing) their principles of morality", and that Barthelemy probably got that idea instead from [[Diodōrou tou Sikeliōtou Bibliothēkēs Historikēs ta Sōzomena|Siculus Didorus]]. Aristotle does mention the Lesbian Rule in Book V, Chapter 10, but in a positive sense - the opposite of Wythe's intent of alluding to the Rule.<ref>"In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts." Aristotle, ''Manichean Ethics'', Book V, Ch. 10, as found in [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html The Internet Classics Archive] (last visited March 26, 2015).</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe conceded that he "had not then consulted Aristotle" when writing the opinion, but says that his reading of Siculus shows that that book did not opine on the moral character of the people of that island, either. Wythe concludes his footnote by saying "that (the people of Lesbos) were not slandered by Barthelemy seemeth to be proved by other authors."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> The admission by such a great scholar of the Greek and Roman classics as Wythe that he did not bother to verify the citation to Aristotle, along with an offhanded assertion that other, unnamed authors said the same thing anyway, are puzzling.<br />
<br />
===Wythe's conclusion from Horace===<br />
Wythe concludes his opinion with a quote from [[Q. Horatii Flacci Opera|Horace's ''Satires'']]. Wythe has "no doubt" that Rose will appeal the Chancery Court's decision, and Wythe expresses the hope that the Virginia Supreme Court will take the opportunity to uphold Wythe and overrule the precedent they set in ''Norton v. Rose''. Such a decision, Wythe said, would only be relished by ''uni aequus virtuti atque ejus amicis'' -- "a friend equally to virtue and to virtue's friends".<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 33, ''quoting'' ''Horatii Satirarum'', Book II, Satire 1, Line 70.</ref><br />
<br />
===References===<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Donelson&diff=37080Love v. Donelson2015-03-27T16:44:52Z<p>Fwding: /* Wythe's conclusion from Horace */</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Donelson''}}<br />
''Love v. Donelson''<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Love against Donelson|Love, against Donelson and Hodgson]]'' (Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1801?).</ref> involved a buyer of land who paid for his purchase with a bond. The buyer was entitled to a partial discount against the original seller of the land, but the original seller transferred the bond to another person who did not know about the possibility of a refund. The court discussed whether the new owner of the bond had to give the original buyer of the land the same discount as the original seller. The opinion is an example of Wythe severely criticizing the Virginia Supreme Court for their interpretation of a statute, and also features Wythe indirectly misquoting Aristotle.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Love bought land from Donelson. Love knew, both through talking with relevant people in Knoxville (in what is now Tennessee) and by examining the map attached to the sales contract, that the land he bought was part of territory that the Cherokee Nation claimed and had not ceded to Great Britain or to the United States. In the contract, Donelson said that he would warrant and sponsor Love's claim against anyone, including the Cherokee. Love paid for the land in the form of a bond, which Donelson later sold to Hodgson. Hodgson claimed that he did not know about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims when he bought the bond.<br />
<br />
The American government ceded at least part of Love's land to the Cherokee under a treaty,<ref>Wythe does not specify which treaty. He might be referring to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Holston Treaty of Holston] of 1791, but Wythe talks about land "abdicated by the british americans" (''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'' at 2), which implies that it was a treaty from the pre-Revolutionary days. Perhaps the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hard_Labour Treaty of Hard Labour] or the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lochaber Treaty of Lochaber]?</ref> <br />
<br />
Hodgson filed suit and won a judgment to claim payment on the bond in 1796. Love filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery to enjoin that judgment so that Love could reduce his required payment in proportion to the amount of land that was ceded to the Cherokee.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
Wythe dismissed Love's petition, with costs. Wythe said that Love's relief against Donelson was an equitable one, not a legal one, and that equitable relief only transfers to the purchaser of a bond if that purchaser knew that the relief existed when they bought the bond. Wythe acknowleged, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court had held differently, and devoted the bulk of the opinion to a discussion of why the judges from that court were in error.<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe noted that if Hodgson had known about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims or that Love did not have proper title to that land when Hodgson accepted the bond, then Love would be entitled to the relief he requested. The evidence, however, did not show that Hodgson knew either of these things when he purchased it. Therefore, Wythe said, the equitable element of Love's claim sticks to his legal claim against Hodgson no better than the feet and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made partly of iron and partly of clay -- partly strong, and partly broken.<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 24, ''referring to'' Daniel 2: 33, 42.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe pointed to one of his earlier decisions, ''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]'', in which he stated that the debtor on a payment bond could not get relief against someone who purchased a bond from the original creditor of a bond if that purchaser did not know about the unfairness involved in the bond's original creation.<ref>''Overstreet v. Randolph'', George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 47.</ref> However, Wythe also noted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in ''Norton v. Rose'', which stated that the person who is assigned a bond or obligation is subject to everything the original creditor was subject to.<ref>''Norton v. Rose'', 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 254 (1796).</ref> <br />
<br />
In classic Wythe form, the bulk of the opinion in ''Love'' involves Wythe dissecting the Virginia Supreme Court's ''Norton v. Rose'' opinion, practically line by line (it is presumably no coincidence that the ''Norton'' opinion reversed one of Wythe's decrees, as Wythe takes pains to point out multiple times). Wythe's primary criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in ''Norton'' is that the judges created a legislative intent from whole cloth, reading meaning into the language of the relevant statute<ref>Ch. 33, October 1748 Session, "An act for ascertaining the damage upon protested bills of exchange; and for the better recovery of debts due on promissory notes; and for the assignment of bonds, obligations, and notes," William Waller Hening, ed., ''The Statutes at Large; being a collection of all the laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619'' (Richmond, VA: Printed for the Editor at the Franklin Press -- W. W. Gray, Printer, 1819), 6: 85.</ref> that was not there.<br />
<br />
===Judge Roane, "far the best of augurs"===<br />
Wythe mockingly compares Judge [[Spencer Roane]]'s ability to divine the legislature's intent to that of "Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of augurs."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 14. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calchas Calchas] was a seer from Greek myth who got his gift for divining from Apollo.</ref> <br />
<br />
===Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't===<br />
Wythe later turns his attention to Judge [http://scvahistory.org/lyons-peter-1779-1809-2/ Peter Lyons]'s statement in ''Norton'' that "the accuracy of the principle (Wythe describes) is not questioned; its application to (''Norton'') is."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> Wythe criticizes this statement by quoting a passage from Book II, Chapter III of Jean-Jacques Barthelemy's [[Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece]]. In the passage, Barthelemy says Aristotle the residents of the island of Lesbos as people who "relaxed their principles of morality, as occasion required, and adapted themselves to circumstances with as much facility as they open and shut certain leaden rules used by their architects".<ref>Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, ''Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece'' (London: Printed for J. Johnson, et al., 4th ed. 1806), 2: 52-3, ''available at'' [http://digital.library.villanova.edu/Collection/vudl:2955 Villanova University Digital Library] (last visited March 27, 2015).</ref> The "leaden rules" refer to flexible rulers used by architects to measure irregular curves. These rulers were called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesbian_rule "Lesbian rules"] because they were originally made of lead from the island of Lesbos. A handwritten note in Wythe's copy of the opinion cites a page from John Taylor's ''[[Elements of the Civil Law]]'' that mentions the "''Norma Lesbia'', which shapes itself to every thing."<ref>John Taylor, ''Elements of the Civil Law'' (London: Charles Bathurst, 3d ed. 1769), 482.</ref> Wythe concludes his opinion by stating that the laws of equity are not as flexible as those leaden architects' rules, and that in a situation such as the one currently before the Chancery, in which Love's and Hodgson's equities are equal, but Hodgson's legal rights are greater, Hodgson must win.<br />
<br />
In a footnote, Wythe describes a discussion he had with "Watkins Leigh, one of William and Mary's ornaments",<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> presumably referring to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_W._Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh].<ref>B.W. Leigh graduated from William & Mary in 1802 and "studied law" according to his [http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000232 Congressional biography]. Wythe describing Leigh as "the ingenious student" implies that Wythe taught Leigh, but we have no definite proof one way or the other.</ref> Leigh contended that Aristotle said nothing about the people of Lesbos "relax(ing) their principles of morality", and that Barthelemy probably got that idea instead from [[Diodōrou tou Sikeliōtou Bibliothēkēs Historikēs ta Sōzomena|Siculus Didorus]]. Although Wythe does not note it, Leigh's argument is bolstered by the fact that Barthelemy cites to Book V, Chapter 14 of Aristotle's ''Manichean Ethics'', but Book V only has eleven chapters. Aristotle does mention the Lesbian Rule in Book V, Chapter 10, but in a positive sense - the opposite of Wythe's intent of alluding to the Rule.<ref>"In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts." Aristotle, ''Manichean Ethics'', Book V, Ch. 10, as found in [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html The Internet Classics Archive] (last visited March 26, 2015).</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe conceded that he "had not then consulted Aristotle" when writing the opinion, but says that his reading of Siculus shows that that book did not opine on the moral character of the people of that island, either. Wythe concludes his footnote by saying "that (the people of Lesbos) were not slandered by Barthelemy seemeth to be proved by other authors."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> The admission by such a great scholar of the Greek and Roman classics as Wythe that he did not bother to verify the citation to Aristotle, along with an offhanded assertion that other, unnamed authors said the same thing anyway, are puzzling.<br />
<br />
===Wythe's conclusion from Horace===<br />
Wythe concludes his opinion with a quote from [[Q. Horatii Flacci Opera|Horace's ''Satires'']]. Wythe has "no doubt" that Rose will appeal the Chancery Court's decision, and Wythe expresses the hope that the Virginia Supreme Court will take the opportunity to uphold Wythe and overrule the precedent they set in ''Norton v. Rose''. Such a decision, Wythe said, would only be relished by ''uni aequus virtuti atque ejus amicis'' -- "a friend equally to virtue and to virtue's friends".<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 33, ''quoting'' ''Horatii Satirarum'', Book II, Satire 1, Line 70.</ref><br />
<br />
===References===<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Donelson&diff=37078Love v. Donelson2015-03-27T16:22:54Z<p>Fwding: /* Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't */</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Donelson''}}<br />
''Love v. Donelson''<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Love against Donelson|Love, against Donelson and Hodgson]]'' (Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1801?).</ref> involved a buyer of land who paid for his purchase with a bond. The buyer was entitled to a partial discount against the original seller of the land, but the original seller transferred the bond to another person who did not know about the possibility of a refund. The court discussed whether the new owner of the bond had to give the original buyer of the land the same discount as the original seller. The opinion is an example of Wythe severely criticizing the Virginia Supreme Court for their interpretation of a statute, and also features Wythe indirectly misquoting Aristotle.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Love bought land from Donelson. Love knew, both through talking with relevant people in Knoxville (in what is now Tennessee) and by examining the map attached to the sales contract, that the land he bought was part of territory that the Cherokee Nation claimed and had not ceded to Great Britain or to the United States. In the contract, Donelson said that he would warrant and sponsor Love's claim against anyone, including the Cherokee. Love paid for the land in the form of a bond, which Donelson later sold to Hodgson. Hodgson claimed that he did not know about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims when he bought the bond.<br />
<br />
The American government ceded at least part of Love's land to the Cherokee under a treaty,<ref>Wythe does not specify which treaty. He might be referring to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Holston Treaty of Holston] of 1791, but Wythe talks about land "abdicated by the british americans" (''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'' at 2), which implies that it was a treaty from the pre-Revolutionary days. Perhaps the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hard_Labour Treaty of Hard Labour] or the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lochaber Treaty of Lochaber]?</ref> <br />
<br />
Hodgson filed suit and won a judgment to claim payment on the bond in 1796. Love filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery to enjoin that judgment so that Love could reduce his required payment in proportion to the amount of land that was ceded to the Cherokee.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
Wythe dismissed Love's petition, with costs. Wythe said that Love's relief against Donelson was an equitable one, not a legal one, and that equitable relief only transfers to the purchaser of a bond if that purchaser knew that the relief existed when they bought the bond. Wythe acknowleged, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court had held differently, and devoted the bulk of the opinion to a discussion of why the judges from that court were in error.<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe noted that if Hodgson had known about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims or that Love did not have proper title to that land when Hodgson accepted the bond, then Love would be entitled to the relief he requested. The evidence, however, did not show that Hodgson knew either of these things when he purchased it. Therefore, Wythe said, the equitable element of Love's claim sticks to his legal claim against Hodgson no better than the feet and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made partly of iron and partly of clay -- partly strong, and partly broken.<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 24, ''referring to'' Daniel 2: 33, 42.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe pointed to one of his earlier decisions, ''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]'', in which he stated that the debtor on a payment bond could not get relief against someone who purchased a bond from the original creditor of a bond if that purchaser did not know about the unfairness involved in the bond's original creation.<ref>''Overstreet v. Randolph'', George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 47.</ref> However, Wythe also noted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in ''Norton v. Rose'', which stated that the person who is assigned a bond or obligation is subject to everything the original creditor was subject to.<ref>''Norton v. Rose'', 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 254 (1796).</ref> <br />
<br />
In classic Wythe form, the bulk of the opinion in ''Love'' involves Wythe dissecting the Virginia Supreme Court's ''Norton v. Rose'' opinion, practically line by line (it is presumably no coincidence that the ''Norton'' opinion reversed one of Wythe's decrees, as Wythe takes pains to point out multiple times). Wythe's primary criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in ''Norton'' is that the judges created a legislative intent from whole cloth, reading meaning into the language of the relevant statute<ref>Ch. 33, October 1748 Session, "An act for ascertaining the damage upon protested bills of exchange; and for the better recovery of debts due on promissory notes; and for the assignment of bonds, obligations, and notes," William Waller Hening, ed., ''The Statutes at Large; being a collection of all the laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619'' (Richmond, VA: Printed for the Editor at the Franklin Press -- W. W. Gray, Printer, 1819), 6: 85.</ref> that was not there.<br />
<br />
===Judge Roane, "far the best of augurs"===<br />
Wythe mockingly compares Judge [[Spencer Roane]]'s ability to divine the legislature's intent to that of "Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of augurs."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 14. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calchas Calchas] was a seer from Greek myth who got his gift for divining from Apollo.</ref> <br />
<br />
===Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't===<br />
Wythe later turns his attention to Judge [http://scvahistory.org/lyons-peter-1779-1809-2/ Peter Lyons]'s statement in ''Norton'' that "the accuracy of the principle (Wythe describes) is not questioned; its application to (''Norton'') is."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> Wythe criticizes this statement by quoting a passage from Book II, Chapter III of Jean-Jacques Barthelemy's [[Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece]]. In the passage, Barthelemy says Aristotle the residents of the island of Lesbos as people who "relaxed their principles of morality, as occasion required, and adapted themselves to circumstances with as much facility as they open and shut certain leaden rules used by their architects".<ref>Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, ''Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece'' (London: Printed for J. Johnson, et al., 4th ed. 1806), 2: 52-3, ''available at'' [http://digital.library.villanova.edu/Collection/vudl:2955 Villanova University Digital Library] (last visited March 27, 2015).</ref> The "leaden rules" refer to flexible rulers used by architects to measure irregular curves. These rulers were called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesbian_rule "Lesbian rules"] because they were originally made of lead from the island of Lesbos. A handwritten note in Wythe's copy of the opinion cites a page from John Taylor's ''[[Elements of the Civil Law]]'' that mentions the "''Norma Lesbia'', which shapes itself to every thing."<ref>John Taylor, ''Elements of the Civil Law'' (London: Charles Bathurst, 3d ed. 1769), 482.</ref> Wythe concludes his opinion by stating that the laws of equity are not as flexible as those leaden architects' rules, and that in a situation such as the one currently before the Chancery, in which Love's and Hodgson's equities are equal, but Hodgson's legal rights are greater, Hodgson must win.<br />
<br />
In a footnote, Wythe describes a discussion he had with "Watkins Leigh, one of William and Mary's ornaments",<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> presumably referring to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_W._Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh].<ref>B.W. Leigh graduated from William & Mary in 1802 and "studied law" according to his [http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000232 Congressional biography]. Wythe describing Leigh as "the ingenious student" implies that Wythe taught Leigh, but we have no definite proof one way or the other.</ref> Leigh contended that Aristotle said nothing about the people of Lesbos "relax(ing) their principles of morality", and that Barthelemy probably got that idea instead from [[Diodōrou tou Sikeliōtou Bibliothēkēs Historikēs ta Sōzomena|Siculus Didorus]]. Although Wythe does not note it, Leigh's argument is bolstered by the fact that Barthelemy cites to Book V, Chapter 14 of Aristotle's ''Manichean Ethics'', but Book V only has eleven chapters. Aristotle does mention the Lesbian Rule in Book V, Chapter 10, but in a positive sense - the opposite of Wythe's intent of alluding to the Rule.<ref>"In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts." Aristotle, ''Manichean Ethics'', Book V, Ch. 10, as found in [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html The Internet Classics Archive] (last visited March 26, 2015).</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe conceded that he "had not then consulted Aristotle" when writing the opinion, but says that his reading of Siculus shows that that book did not opine on the moral character of the people of that island, either. Wythe concludes his footnote by saying "that (the people of Lesbos) were not slandered by Barthelemy seemeth to be proved by other authors."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> The admission by such a great scholar of the Greek and Roman classics as Wythe that he did not bother to verify the citation to Aristotle, along with an offhanded assertion that other, unnamed authors said the same thing anyway, are puzzling.<br />
<br />
===Wythe's conclusion from Horace===<br />
Wythe concludes his opinion with a quote from [[Q. Horatii Flacci Opera|Horace's ''Satires'']], deeming himself "uni aequus virtuti atque ejus amicis" -- "a friend equally to virtue and to virtue's friends".<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 33, ''quoting'' ''Horatii Satirarum'', Book II, Satire 1, Line 70.</ref><br />
===References===<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwdinghttp://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php?title=Love_v._Donelson&diff=37076Love v. Donelson2015-03-27T16:14:00Z<p>Fwding: /* Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't */</p>
<hr />
<div>{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Love v. Donelson''}}<br />
''Love v. Donelson''<ref>George Wythe, ''[[Love against Donelson|Love, against Donelson and Hodgson]]'' (Richmond, VA: Thomas Nicolson, 1801?).</ref> involved a buyer of land who paid for his purchase with a bond. The buyer was entitled to a partial discount against the original seller of the land, but the original seller transferred the bond to another person who did not know about the possibility of a refund. The court discussed whether the new owner of the bond had to give the original buyer of the land the same discount as the original seller. The opinion is an example of Wythe severely criticizing the Virginia Supreme Court for their interpretation of a statute, and also features Wythe indirectly misquoting Aristotle.<br />
__NOTOC__<br />
==Background==<br />
Love bought land from Donelson. Love knew, both through talking with relevant people in Knoxville (in what is now Tennessee) and by examining the map attached to the sales contract, that the land he bought was part of territory that the Cherokee Nation claimed and had not ceded to Great Britain or to the United States. In the contract, Donelson said that he would warrant and sponsor Love's claim against anyone, including the Cherokee. Love paid for the land in the form of a bond, which Donelson later sold to Hodgson. Hodgson claimed that he did not know about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims when he bought the bond.<br />
<br />
The American government ceded at least part of Love's land to the Cherokee under a treaty,<ref>Wythe does not specify which treaty. He might be referring to the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Holston Treaty of Holston] of 1791, but Wythe talks about land "abdicated by the british americans" (''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'' at 2), which implies that it was a treaty from the pre-Revolutionary days. Perhaps the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Hard_Labour Treaty of Hard Labour] or the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lochaber Treaty of Lochaber]?</ref> <br />
<br />
Hodgson filed suit and won a judgment to claim payment on the bond in 1796. Love filed a bill with the High Court of Chancery to enjoin that judgment so that Love could reduce his required payment in proportion to the amount of land that was ceded to the Cherokee.<br />
<br />
==The Court's Decision==<br />
Wythe dismissed Love's petition, with costs. Wythe said that Love's relief against Donelson was an equitable one, not a legal one, and that equitable relief only transfers to the purchaser of a bond if that purchaser knew that the relief existed when they bought the bond. Wythe acknowleged, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court had held differently, and devoted the bulk of the opinion to a discussion of why the judges from that court were in error.<br />
<br />
==Wythe's Discussion==<br />
Wythe noted that if Hodgson had known about Donelson's promise to warrant the land against other claims or that Love did not have proper title to that land when Hodgson accepted the bond, then Love would be entitled to the relief he requested. The evidence, however, did not show that Hodgson knew either of these things when he purchased it. Therefore, Wythe said, the equitable element of Love's claim sticks to his legal claim against Hodgson no better than the feet and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made partly of iron and partly of clay -- partly strong, and partly broken.<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 24, ''referring to'' Daniel 2: 33, 42.</ref><br />
<br />
Wythe pointed to one of his earlier decisions, ''[[Overstreet v. Randolph]]'', in which he stated that the debtor on a payment bond could not get relief against someone who purchased a bond from the original creditor of a bond if that purchaser did not know about the unfairness involved in the bond's original creation.<ref>''Overstreet v. Randolph'', George Wythe, ''[[Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery|Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High Court of Chancery with Remarks upon Decrees by the Court of Appeals, Reversing Some of Those Decisions]]'', 2nd ed., ed. B.B. Minor (Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1852), 47.</ref> However, Wythe also noted the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in ''Norton v. Rose'', which stated that the person who is assigned a bond or obligation is subject to everything the original creditor was subject to.<ref>''Norton v. Rose'', 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 254 (1796).</ref> <br />
<br />
In classic Wythe form, the bulk of the opinion in ''Love'' involves Wythe dissecting the Virginia Supreme Court's ''Norton v. Rose'' opinion, practically line by line (it is presumably no coincidence that the ''Norton'' opinion reversed one of Wythe's decrees, as Wythe takes pains to point out multiple times). Wythe's primary criticism of the Supreme Court's ruling in ''Norton'' is that the judges created a legislative intent from whole cloth, reading meaning into the language of the relevant statute<ref>Ch. 33, October 1748 Session, "An act for ascertaining the damage upon protested bills of exchange; and for the better recovery of debts due on promissory notes; and for the assignment of bonds, obligations, and notes," William Waller Hening, ed., ''The Statutes at Large; being a collection of all the laws of Virginia, from the first session of the Legislature in the year 1619'' (Richmond, VA: Printed for the Editor at the Franklin Press -- W. W. Gray, Printer, 1819), 6: 85.</ref> that was not there.<br />
<br />
===Judge Roane, "far the best of augurs"===<br />
Wythe mockingly compares Judge [[Spencer Roane]]'s ability to divine the legislature's intent to that of "Calchas, son of Thestor, far the best of augurs."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 14. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calchas Calchas] was a seer from Greek myth who got his gift for divining from Apollo.</ref> <br />
<br />
===Judge Lyons, architect rules, and a quote of Aristotle that wasn't===<br />
Wythe later turns his attention to Judge [http://scvahistory.org/lyons-peter-1779-1809-2/ Peter Lyons]'s statement in ''Norton'' that "the accuracy of the principle (Wythe describes) is not questioned; its application to (''Norton'') is."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> Wythe criticizes this statement by quoting a passage from Book II, Chapter III of Jean-Jacques Barthelemy's [[Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece]]. In the passage, Barthelemy says Aristotle the residents of the island of Lesbos as people who "relaxed their principles of morality, as occasion required, and adapted themselves to circumstances with as much facility as they open and shut certain leaden rules used by their architects".<ref>Jean-Jacques Barthelemy, ''Travels of Anacharsis the Younger in Greece'' (London: Printed for J. Johnson, et al., 4th ed. 1806), 2: 52-3, ''available at'' [http://digital.library.villanova.edu/Collection/vudl:2955 Villanova University Digital Library].</ref> The "leaden rules" refer to flexible rulers used by architects to measure irregular curves. These rulers were called [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesbian_rule "Lesbian rules"] because they were originally made of lead from the island of Lesbos. A handwritten note in Wythe's copy of the opinion cites a page from John Taylor's ''[[Elements of the Civil Law]]'' that mentions the "''Norma Lesbia'', which shapes itself to every thing."<ref>John Taylor, ''Elements of the Civil Law'' (London: Charles Bathurst, 3d ed. 1769), 482.</ref> Wythe concludes his opinion by stating that the laws of equity are not as flexible as those leaden architects' rules, and that in a situation such as the one currently before the Chancery, in which Love's and Hodgson's equities are equal, but Hodgson's legal rights are greater, Hodgson must win.<br />
<br />
In a footnote, Wythe describes a discussion he had with "Watkins Leigh, one of William and Mary's ornaments",<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> presumably referring to [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_W._Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh].<ref>B.W. Leigh graduated from William & Mary in 1802 and "studied law" according to his [http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000232 Congressional biography]. Wythe describing Leigh as "the ingenious student" implies that Wythe taught Leigh, but we have no definite proof one way or the other.</ref> Leigh contended that Aristotle said nothing about the people of Lesbos "relax(ing) their principles of morality", and that Barthelemy probably got that idea instead from [[Diodōrou tou Sikeliōtou Bibliothēkēs Historikēs ta Sōzomena|Siculus Didorus]]. Although Wythe does not note it, Leigh's argument is bolstered by the fact that Barthelemy cites to Book V, Chapter 14 of Aristotle's ''Manichean Ethics'', but Book V only has eleven chapters. Aristotle does mention the Lesbian Rule in Book V, Chapter 10, but in a positive sense - the opposite of Wythe's intent of alluding to the Rule.<ref>"In fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the rule also is indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian moulding; the rule adapts itself to the shape of the stone and is not rigid, and so too the decree is adapted to the facts." Aristotle, ''Manichean Ethics'', Book V, Ch. 10, as found in [http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.5.v.html The Internet Classics Archive] (last visited March 26, 2015).</ref> <br />
<br />
Wythe conceded that he "had not then consulted Aristotle" when writing the opinion, but says that his reading of Siculus shows that that book did not opine on the moral character of the people of that island, either. Wythe concludes his footnote by saying "that (the people of Lesbos) were not slandered by Barthelemy seemeth to be proved by other authors."<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 32.</ref> The admission by such a great scholar of the Greek and Roman classics as Wythe that he did not bother to verify the citation to Aristotle, along with an offhanded assertion that other, unnamed authors said the same thing anyway, are puzzling.<br />
<br />
===Wythe's conclusion from Horace===<br />
Wythe concludes his opinion with a quote from [[Q. Horatii Flacci Opera|Horace's ''Satires'']], deeming himself "uni aequus virtuti atque ejus amicis" -- "a friend equally to virtue and to virtue's friends".<ref>''Love, against Donelson and Hodgson'', 33, ''quoting'' ''Horatii Satirarum'', Book II, Satire 1, Line 70.</ref><br />
===References===<br />
<references/><br />
<br />
[[Category:Cases]]</div>Fwding